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Single Idea 16972

[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory ]

Full Idea

Aristotle sees as the main types of aitia (explanation) those that are also to be construed as the main aspects of the physis (nature) of anything.

Gist of Idea

The four explanations are the main aspects of a thing's nature

Source

report of Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE]) by Julius Moravcsik - Aristotle on Adequate Explanations 1

Book Ref

-: 'Synthese' [-], p.6


A Reaction

Interestingly, this suggests that having rejected the Four Causes in favour of the Four Explanations, we might even consider them as the Four Natures, which ties explanation very closely to essence.


The 21 ideas with the same theme [essence is what intrinsically explains a thing]:

Primary substances are ontological in 'Categories', and explanatory in 'Metaphysics' [Aristotle, by Wedin]
Metaphysics is the science of ultimate explanation, or of pure existence, or of primary existence [Aristotle, by Politis]
The four explanations are the main aspects of a thing's nature [Aristotle, by Moravcsik]
A thing's nature is what causes its changes and stability [Aristotle]
Aristotelian essences are properties mentioned at the starting point of a science [Aristotle, by Kung]
All natures of things produce some effect [Spinoza]
Explanatory essence won't do, because it won't distinguish the accidental from the essential [Locke, by Pasnau]
If you fully understand a subject and its qualities, you see how the second derive from the first [Leibniz]
Essential properties are the 'deepest' ones which explain the others [Copi, by Rami]
Aristotelian essences underlie a thing's existence, explain it, and must belong to it [Kung]
Essentialism is justified if the essential properties of things explain their other properties [Brody]
Essences are not explanations, but individuations [Wiggins]
The essence of a star includes the released binding energy which keeps it from collapse [Inwagen]
Essences mainly explain the existence of unified substance [Witt]
Natural kinds don't need essentialism to be explanatory [Dupré]
An essential property of something must be bound up with what it is to be that thing [Fine,K, by Rami]
Explanation can't give an account of essence, because it is too multi-faceted [Lowe]
All things must have an essence (a 'what it is'), or we would be unable to think about them [Lowe]
Essence is not explanatory but constitutive [Oderberg]
Being a deepest explanatory feature is an actual, not a modal property [Sidelle]
The Kripke and Putnam view of kinds makes them explanatorily basic, but has modal implications [Mackie,P]