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Single Idea 16982

[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential ]

Full Idea

Two totally distinct 'historical chains' that be sheer accident assign the same name to the same man should probably count as creating distinct names despite the identity of the referents.

Gist of Idea

A man has two names if the historical chains are different - even if they are the same!

Source

Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity preface [1980], p.08 n9)

Book Ref

Kripke,Saul: 'Naming and Necessity' [Blackwell 1980], p.8


A Reaction

A nice puzzle for his own theory. 'What's you name?' 'Alice, and Alice!'


The 8 ideas from 'Naming and Necessity preface'

With the necessity of self-identity plus Leibniz's Law, identity has to be an 'internal' relation [Kripke]
The indiscernibility of identicals is as self-evident as the law of contradiction [Kripke]
A man has two names if the historical chains are different - even if they are the same! [Kripke]
The very act of designating of an object with properties gives knowledge of a contingent truth [Kripke]
Instead of talking about possible worlds, we can always say "It is possible that.." [Kripke]
Probability with dice uses possible worlds, abstractions which fictionally simplify things [Kripke]
Possible worlds allowed the application of set-theoretic models to modal logic [Kripke]
I don't think possible worlds reductively reveal the natures of modal operators etc. [Kripke]