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Full Idea
I do not think of 'possible worlds' as providing a reductive analysis in any philosophically significant sense, that is, as uncovering the ultimate nature, from either an epistemological or a metaphysical view, of modal operators, propositions etc.
Gist of Idea
I don't think possible worlds reductively reveal the natures of modal operators etc.
Source
Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity preface [1980], p.19 n18)
Book Ref
Kripke,Saul: 'Naming and Necessity' [Blackwell 1980], p.19
A Reaction
I think this remark opens the door for Kit Fine's approach, of showing what modality is by specifying its sources. Possible worlds model the behaviour of modal inferences.
Related Idea
Idea 8941 We can't explain 'possibility' in terms of 'possible' worlds [Fisher]
| 16981 | With the necessity of self-identity plus Leibniz's Law, identity has to be an 'internal' relation [Kripke] |
| 4942 | The indiscernibility of identicals is as self-evident as the law of contradiction [Kripke] |
| 16982 | A man has two names if the historical chains are different - even if they are the same! [Kripke] |
| 9385 | The very act of designating of an object with properties gives knowledge of a contingent truth [Kripke] |
| 4943 | Instead of talking about possible worlds, we can always say "It is possible that.." [Kripke] |
| 16983 | Probability with dice uses possible worlds, abstractions which fictionally simplify things [Kripke] |
| 16985 | Possible worlds allowed the application of set-theoretic models to modal logic [Kripke] |
| 16984 | I don't think possible worlds reductively reveal the natures of modal operators etc. [Kripke] |