more from this thinker | more from this text
Full Idea
I think it is not the case that there might have been unicorns. I wouldn't say it is necessary that there are no unicorns, but that we just can't say under what circumstances there would have been unicorns.
Gist of Idea
That there might have been unicorns is false; we don't know the circumstances for unicorns
Source
Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970], Lecture 1)
Book Ref
Kripke,Saul: 'Naming and Necessity' [Blackwell 1980], p.24
A Reaction
His point seems to be that unicorns are insufficiently individuated by the legends, whereas a typical sample of an actual creature contains everything that will individuate the species.
| 17209 | A thing is contingent if nothing in its essence determines whether or not it exists [Spinoza] |
| 5039 | If non-existents are possible, their existence would replace what now exists, which cannot therefore be necessary [Leibniz] |
| 16986 | That there might have been unicorns is false; we don't know the circumstances for unicorns [Kripke] |
| 17590 | A merely possible object clearly isn't there, so that is a defective notion [Inwagen] |
| 17591 | Merely possible objects must be consistent properties, or haecceities [Inwagen] |
| 18925 | If talking donkeys are possible, something exists which could be a talking donkey [Williamson, by Cameron] |
| 15142 | Our ability to count objects across possibilities favours the Barcan formulas [Williamson] |
| 13719 | Barcan Formula problem: there might have been a ghost, despite nothing existing which could be a ghost [Sider] |
| 19037 | Are there possible objects which nothing has ever had the potentiality to produce? [Vetter] |