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Single Idea 1699

[filed under theme 7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence ]

Full Idea

That from which the implication of existence does not hold reciprocally is thought to be prior.

Clarification

'Prior' usually means 'has to come first in a sequence of reasoning'

Gist of Idea

A thing is prior to another if it implies its existence

Source

Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 14a32)

Book Ref

Aristotle: 'Categories and De Interpretatione', ed/tr. Ackrill,J.R. [OUP 1963], p.39


A Reaction

shadows and objects


The 17 ideas with the same theme [things that rely on other things for their existence]:

A thing is prior to another if it implies its existence [Aristotle]
Of interdependent things, the prior one causes the other's existence [Aristotle]
What is prior is always potentially present in what is next in order [Aristotle]
Prior things can exist without posterior things, but not vice versa [Aristotle]
Many of us find Frege's claim that truths depend on one another an obscure idea [Heck on Frege]
Parallelism is intuitive, so it is more fundamental than sameness of direction [Frege, by Heck]
Being primitive or prior always depends on a constructional system [Goodman]
Ontological dependence rests on essential connection, not necessary connection [Molnar]
An object is dependent if its essence prevents it from existing without some other object [Fine,K]
A natural modal account of dependence says x depends on y if y must exist when x does [Fine,K]
An object depends on another if the second cannot be eliminated from the first's definition [Fine,K]
Dependency is the real counterpart of one term defining another [Fine,K]
There is 'weak' dependence in one definition, and 'strong' dependence in all the definitions [Fine,K]
Independent objects can exist apart, and maybe even entirely alone [Simons]
There may be a one-way direction of dependence among sets, and among natural numbers [Linnebo]
Non-causal dependence is at present only dimly understood [Liggins]
There's essential, modal, explanatory, conceptual, metaphysical and constitutive dependence [Jenkins, by PG]