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Full Idea
If a Gödelian fraud were exposed, Gödel would no longer be called 'the author of the incompleteness theorem', but he would still be called 'Gödel'. The description, therefore, does not abbreviate the name.
Gist of Idea
Even if Gödel didn't produce his theorems, he's still called 'Gödel'
Source
Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity notes and addenda [1972], note 37)
Book Ref
Kripke,Saul: 'Naming and Necessity' [Blackwell 1980], p.87
A Reaction
Clearly we can't make the description a necessary fact about Gödel, but that doesn't invalidate the idea that successful reference needs some description. E.g. Gödel is a person.
Related Idea
Idea 17031 A name can still refer even if it satisfies none of its well-known descriptions [Kripke]
| 17059 | Unicorns are vague, so no actual or possible creature could count as a unicorn [Kripke] |
| 17058 | What many people consider merely physically necessary I consider completely necessary [Kripke] |
| 4970 | What is often held to be mere physical necessity is actually metaphysical necessity [Kripke] |
| 9221 | The best known objection to counterparts is Kripke's, that Humphrey doesn't care if his counterpart wins [Kripke, by Sider] |
| 4950 | Possible worlds are useful in set theory, but can be very misleading elsewhere [Kripke] |
| 17000 | We might fix identities for small particulars, but it is utopian to hope for such things [Kripke] |
| 16999 | A vague identity may seem intransitive, and we might want to talk of 'counterparts' [Kripke] |
| 17003 | Kaplan's 'Dthat' is a useful operator for transforming a description into a rigid designation [Kripke] |
| 4956 | A description may fix a reference even when it is not true of its object [Kripke] |
| 17032 | Even if Gödel didn't produce his theorems, he's still called 'Gödel' [Kripke] |
| 17044 | A relation can clearly be reflexive, and identity is the smallest reflexive relation [Kripke] |
| 11868 | A different piece of wood could have been used for that table; constitution isn't identity [Wiggins on Kripke] |
| 17052 | The a priori analytic truths involving fixing of reference are contingent [Kripke] |
| 4969 | I regard the mind-body problem as wide open, and extremely confusing [Kripke] |