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Single Idea 17045

[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties ]

Full Idea

De re modality is an object having essential properties.

Gist of Idea

De re modality is an object having essential properties

Source

Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970], Lecture 3)

Book Ref

Kripke,Saul: 'Naming and Necessity' [Blackwell 1980], p.110

A Reaction

[Plucked out of context] It is because Kripke says there are necessities about things, and not just about statements about things, that he has caused a revival of essentialism. Fine has famously said modality depends on essence.

The 90 ideas from 'Naming and Necessity lectures'

10559 Kripke's modal semantics presupposes certain facts about possible worlds [Kripke, by Zalta]
10437 Names are rigid, making them unlike definite descriptions [Kripke, by Sainsbury]
16395 Kripke separated semantics from metaphysics, rather than linking them, making the latter independent [Kripke, by Stalnaker]
8957 Some references, such as 'Neptune', have to be fixed by description rather than baptism [Kripke, by Szabó]
10428 Proper names must have referents, because they are not descriptive [Kripke, by Sainsbury]
2408 Kripke has demonstrated that some necessary truths are only knowable a posteriori [Kripke, by Chalmers]
14896 Kripke's metaphysics (essences, kinds, rigidity) blocks the slide into sociology [Kripke, by Ladyman/Ross]
17647 Kripke individuates objects by essential modal properties (and presupposes essentialism) [Kripke, by Putnam]
5450 For Kripke, essence is origin; for Putnam, essence is properties; for Wiggins, essence is membership of a kind [Kripke, by Mautner]
16955 Kripke says internal structure fixes species; I say it is genetic affinity and a common descent [Kripke, by Dummett]
13971 Kripke claims that some properties, only knowable posteriori, are known a priori to be essential [Kripke, by Soames]
12100 An essence is the necessary properties, derived from an intuitive identity, in origin, type and material [Kripke, by Witt]
11867 If we lose track of origin, how do we show we are maintaining a reference? [Kripke, by Wiggins]
12018 Kripke argues, of the Queen, that parents of an organism are essentially so [Kripke, by Forbes,G]
4797 Instead of being regularities, maybe natural laws are the weak a posteriori necessities of Kripke [Kripke, by Psillos]
4728 Kripke separates necessary and a priori, proposing necessary a posteriori and contingent a priori examples [Kripke, by O'Grady]
13967 Kripke's essentialist necessary a posteriori opened the gap between conceivable and really possible [Soames on Kripke]
13970 Kripke gets to the necessary a posteriori by only allowing conceivability when combined with actuality [Kripke, by Soames]
7761 Test for rigidity by inserting into the sentence 'N might not have been N' [Kripke, by Lycan]
7693 Kripke avoids difficulties of transworld identity by saying it is a decision, not a discovery [Kripke, by Jacquette]
5821 Saying that natural kinds are 'rigid designators' is the same as saying they are 'indexical' [Kripke, by Putnam]
14068 If Kripke names must still denote a thing in a non-actual situation, the statue isn't its clay [Gibbard on Kripke]
10436 A rigid expression may refer at a world to an object not existing in that world [Kripke, by Sainsbury]
8259 Kripke has breathed new life into the a priori/a posteriori distinction [Kripke, by Lowe]
13975 Kripke was more successful in illuminating necessity than a priority (and their relations to analyticity) [Kripke, by Soames]
7430 Kripke assumes that mind-brain identity designates rigidly, which it doesn't [Armstrong on Kripke]
7867 If consciousness could separate from brain, then it cannot be identical with brain [Kripke, by Papineau]
3228 Kripke says pain is necessarily pain, but a brain state isn't necessarily painful [Kripke, by Rey]
17874 Kripke has a definitional account of kinds, but not of naming [Almog on Kripke]
16394 Kripke derives accounts of reference and proper names from assumptions about worlds and essences [Stalnaker on Kripke]
5822 The important cause is not between dubbing and current use, but between the item and the speaker's information [Evans on Kripke]
4689 Kripke makes reference a largely social matter, external to the mind of the speaker [Kripke, by McGinn]
17504 Kripke's theory is important because it gives a collective account of reference [Kripke, by Putnam]
6765 Nominal essence may well be neither necessary nor sufficient for a natural kind [Kripke, by Bird]
11880 Kripke says his necessary a posteriori examples are known a priori to be necessary [Kripke, by Mackie,P]
16992 Possible worlds aren't puzzling places to learn about, but places we ourselves describe [Kripke]
16991 No one seems to know the identity conditions for a material object (or for people) over time [Kripke]
16996 Given that Nixon is indeed a human being, that he might not have been does not concern knowledge [Kripke]
16997 An essential property is true of an object in any case where it would have existed [Kripke]
4955 Some definitions aim to fix a reference rather than give a meaning [Kripke]
16995 Given that a table is made of molecules, could it not be molecular and still be this table? [Kripke]
4949 Names are rigid designators, which designate the same object in all possible worlds [Kripke]
4951 A bundle of qualities is a collection of abstractions, so it can't be a particular [Kripke]
4948 Intuition is the strongest possible evidence one can have about anything [Kripke]
16989 Rather than 'a priori truth', it is best to stick to whether some person knows it on a priori evidence [Kripke]
4947 A priori truths can be known independently of experience - but they don't have to be [Kripke]
4953 We do not begin with possible worlds and place objects in them; we begin with objects in the real world [Kripke]
16993 If we discuss what might have happened to Nixon, we stipulate that it is about Nixon [Kripke]
16998 Transworld identification is unproblematic, because we stipulate that we rigidly refer to something [Kripke]
17001 A table in some possible world should not even be identified by its essential properties [Kripke]
4952 Identification across possible worlds does not need properties, even essential ones [Kripke]
16990 A priori = Necessary because we imagine all worlds, and we know without looking at actuality? [Kripke]
9386 The meter is defined necessarily, but the stick being one meter long is contingent a priori [Kripke]
16988 Descriptive reference shows how to refer, how to identify two things, and how to challenge existence [Kripke, by PG]
16986 That there might have been unicorns is false; we don't know the circumstances for unicorns [Kripke]
17029 It can't be necessary that Aristotle had the properties commonly attributed to him [Kripke]
4958 Identities like 'heat is molecule motion' are necessary (in the highest degree), not contingent [Kripke]
17035 We refer through the community, going back to the original referent [Kripke]
17033 We may refer through a causal chain, but still change what is referred to [Kripke]
17031 A name can still refer even if it satisfies none of its well-known descriptions [Kripke]
17034 Analyses of concepts using entirely different terms are very inclined to fail [Kripke]
17038 If Hesperus and Phosophorus are the same, they can't possibly be different [Kripke]
17037 Physical necessity may be necessity in the highest degree [Kripke]
17030 Important properties of an object need not be essential to it [Kripke]
17036 Identity statements can be contingent if they rely on descriptions [Kripke]
17046 Could the actual Queen have been born of different parents? [Kripke]
17045 De re modality is an object having essential properties [Kripke]
17055 Atomic number 79 is part of the nature of the gold we know [Kripke]
17047 If we imagine this table made of ice or different wood, we are imagining a different table [Kripke]
4959 A name's reference is not fixed by any marks or properties of the referent [Kripke]
5832 Identity must be necessary, but pain isn't necessarily a brain state, so they aren't identical [Kripke, by Schwartz,SP]
4968 Identity theorists seem committed to no-brain-event-no-pain, and vice versa, which seems wrong [Kripke]
4967 It seems logically possible to have the pain brain state without the actual pain [Kripke]
17056 Terms for natural kinds are very close to proper names [Kripke]
4963 The properties that fix reference are contingent, the properties involving meaning are necessary [Kripke]
17053 Gold's atomic number might not be 79, but if it is, could non-79 stuff be gold? [Kripke]
4964 'Cats are animals' has turned out to be a necessary truth [Kripke]
4960 "'Hesperus' is 'Phosphorus'" is necessarily true, if it is true, but not known a priori [Kripke]
4966 Theoretical identities are between rigid designators, and so are necessary a posteriori [Kripke]
4961 It is a necessary truth that Elizabeth II was the child of two particular parents [Kripke]
17048 Analytic judgements are a priori, even when their content is empirical [Kripke]
9387 The scientific discovery (if correct) that gold has atomic number 79 is a necessary truth [Kripke]
17054 Scientific discoveries about gold are necessary truths [Kripke]
17057 Once we've found that heat is molecular motion, then that's what it is, in all possible worlds [Kripke]
4965 Science searches basic structures in search of essences [Kripke]
17050 Tigers may lack all the properties we originally used to identify them [Kripke]
17051 The original concept of 'cat' comes from paradigmatic instances [Kripke]
17049 'Tiger' designates a species, and merely looking like the species is not enough [Kripke]
8274 Socrates can't have a necessary origin, because he might have had no 'origin' [Lowe on Kripke]
14893 Rigid designation creates a puzzle - why do some necessary truths appear to be contingent? [Kripke, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro]