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Single Idea 17046
[filed under theme 9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
]
Full Idea
Could the Queen - could this woman herself - have been born of different parents from the parents from whom she actually came?
Gist of Idea
Could the actual Queen have been born of different parents?
Source
Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970], Lecture 3)
Book Ref
Kripke,Saul: 'Naming and Necessity' [Blackwell 1980], p.112
A Reaction
Tricky! No, because the past is fixed? Could the Queen have visited Russia when she was 20? I suppose so. Might she not have had parents, given who she is? I don't see why not. Could this desk have been made by someone else? Why not?
Related Idea
Idea 1792
He taught that there are two elements, fire the maker, and earth the matter [Parmenides, by Diog. Laertius]
The
137 ideas
from Saul A. Kripke
10163
|
Propositional modal logic has been proved to be complete
[Kripke, by Feferman/Feferman]
|
10760
|
With possible worlds, S4 and S5 are sound and complete, but S1-S3 are not even sound
[Kripke, by Rossberg]
|
16189
|
The variable domain approach to quantified modal logic invalidates the Barcan Formula
[Kripke, by Simchen]
|
15132
|
The Barcan formulas fail in models with varying domains
[Kripke, by Williamson]
|
9172
|
A 'rigid designator' designates the same object in all possible worlds
[Kripke]
|
9171
|
The function of names is simply to refer
[Kripke]
|
9173
|
We cannot say that Nixon might have been a different man from the one he actually was
[Kripke]
|
9174
|
It is necessary that this table is not made of ice, but we don't know it a priori
[Kripke]
|
9175
|
We may fix the reference of 'Cicero' by a description, but thereafter the name is rigid
[Kripke]
|
9176
|
Modal statements about this table never refer to counterparts; that confuses epistemology and metaphysics
[Kripke]
|
9177
|
Identity theorists must deny that pains can be imagined without brain states
[Kripke]
|
9178
|
Pain, unlike heat, is picked out by an essential property
[Kripke]
|
7430
|
Kripke assumes that mind-brain identity designates rigidly, which it doesn't
[Armstrong on Kripke]
|
7867
|
If consciousness could separate from brain, then it cannot be identical with brain
[Kripke, by Papineau]
|
3228
|
Kripke says pain is necessarily pain, but a brain state isn't necessarily painful
[Kripke, by Rey]
|
16394
|
Kripke derives accounts of reference and proper names from assumptions about worlds and essences
[Stalnaker on Kripke]
|
17874
|
Kripke has a definitional account of kinds, but not of naming
[Almog on Kripke]
|
5822
|
The important cause is not between dubbing and current use, but between the item and the speaker's information
[Evans on Kripke]
|
4689
|
Kripke makes reference a largely social matter, external to the mind of the speaker
[Kripke, by McGinn]
|
17504
|
Kripke's theory is important because it gives a collective account of reference
[Kripke, by Putnam]
|
8259
|
Kripke has breathed new life into the a priori/a posteriori distinction
[Kripke, by Lowe]
|
13975
|
Kripke was more successful in illuminating necessity than a priority (and their relations to analyticity)
[Kripke, by Soames]
|
7761
|
Test for rigidity by inserting into the sentence 'N might not have been N'
[Kripke, by Lycan]
|
7693
|
Kripke avoids difficulties of transworld identity by saying it is a decision, not a discovery
[Kripke, by Jacquette]
|
5821
|
Saying that natural kinds are 'rigid designators' is the same as saying they are 'indexical'
[Kripke, by Putnam]
|
14068
|
If Kripke names must still denote a thing in a non-actual situation, the statue isn't its clay
[Gibbard on Kripke]
|
10436
|
A rigid expression may refer at a world to an object not existing in that world
[Kripke, by Sainsbury]
|
6765
|
Nominal essence may well be neither necessary nor sufficient for a natural kind
[Kripke, by Bird]
|
8957
|
Some references, such as 'Neptune', have to be fixed by description rather than baptism
[Kripke, by Szabó]
|
10428
|
Proper names must have referents, because they are not descriptive
[Kripke, by Sainsbury]
|
2408
|
Kripke has demonstrated that some necessary truths are only knowable a posteriori
[Kripke, by Chalmers]
|
14896
|
Kripke's metaphysics (essences, kinds, rigidity) blocks the slide into sociology
[Kripke, by Ladyman/Ross]
|
17647
|
Kripke individuates objects by essential modal properties (and presupposes essentialism)
[Kripke, by Putnam]
|
5450
|
For Kripke, essence is origin; for Putnam, essence is properties; for Wiggins, essence is membership of a kind
[Kripke, by Mautner]
|
16955
|
Kripke says internal structure fixes species; I say it is genetic affinity and a common descent
[Kripke, by Dummett]
|
10437
|
Names are rigid, making them unlike definite descriptions
[Kripke, by Sainsbury]
|
10559
|
Kripke's modal semantics presupposes certain facts about possible worlds
[Kripke, by Zalta]
|
16395
|
Kripke separated semantics from metaphysics, rather than linking them, making the latter independent
[Kripke, by Stalnaker]
|
13967
|
Kripke's essentialist necessary a posteriori opened the gap between conceivable and really possible
[Soames on Kripke]
|
13970
|
Kripke gets to the necessary a posteriori by only allowing conceivability when combined with actuality
[Kripke, by Soames]
|
4728
|
Kripke separates necessary and a priori, proposing necessary a posteriori and contingent a priori examples
[Kripke, by O'Grady]
|
11867
|
If we lose track of origin, how do we show we are maintaining a reference?
[Kripke, by Wiggins]
|
12018
|
Kripke argues, of the Queen, that parents of an organism are essentially so
[Kripke, by Forbes,G]
|
13971
|
Kripke claims that some properties, only knowable posteriori, are known a priori to be essential
[Kripke, by Soames]
|
12100
|
An essence is the necessary properties, derived from an intuitive identity, in origin, type and material
[Kripke, by Witt]
|
4797
|
Instead of being regularities, maybe natural laws are the weak a posteriori necessities of Kripke
[Kripke, by Psillos]
|
11880
|
Kripke says his necessary a posteriori examples are known a priori to be necessary
[Kripke, by Mackie,P]
|
16991
|
No one seems to know the identity conditions for a material object (or for people) over time
[Kripke]
|
16990
|
A priori = Necessary because we imagine all worlds, and we know without looking at actuality?
[Kripke]
|
9386
|
The meter is defined necessarily, but the stick being one meter long is contingent a priori
[Kripke]
|
16992
|
Possible worlds aren't puzzling places to learn about, but places we ourselves describe
[Kripke]
|
16993
|
If we discuss what might have happened to Nixon, we stipulate that it is about Nixon
[Kripke]
|
16998
|
Transworld identification is unproblematic, because we stipulate that we rigidly refer to something
[Kripke]
|
17001
|
A table in some possible world should not even be identified by its essential properties
[Kripke]
|
4952
|
Identification across possible worlds does not need properties, even essential ones
[Kripke]
|
4955
|
Some definitions aim to fix a reference rather than give a meaning
[Kripke]
|
4949
|
Names are rigid designators, which designate the same object in all possible worlds
[Kripke]
|
4951
|
A bundle of qualities is a collection of abstractions, so it can't be a particular
[Kripke]
|
16996
|
Given that Nixon is indeed a human being, that he might not have been does not concern knowledge
[Kripke]
|
16997
|
An essential property is true of an object in any case where it would have existed
[Kripke]
|
16995
|
Given that a table is made of molecules, could it not be molecular and still be this table?
[Kripke]
|
16988
|
Descriptive reference shows how to refer, how to identify two things, and how to challenge existence
[Kripke, by PG]
|
4953
|
We do not begin with possible worlds and place objects in them; we begin with objects in the real world
[Kripke]
|
16989
|
Rather than 'a priori truth', it is best to stick to whether some person knows it on a priori evidence
[Kripke]
|
4947
|
A priori truths can be known independently of experience - but they don't have to be
[Kripke]
|
16986
|
That there might have been unicorns is false; we don't know the circumstances for unicorns
[Kripke]
|
4948
|
Intuition is the strongest possible evidence one can have about anything
[Kripke]
|
4958
|
Identities like 'heat is molecule motion' are necessary (in the highest degree), not contingent
[Kripke]
|
17035
|
We refer through the community, going back to the original referent
[Kripke]
|
17033
|
We may refer through a causal chain, but still change what is referred to
[Kripke]
|
17029
|
It can't be necessary that Aristotle had the properties commonly attributed to him
[Kripke]
|
17038
|
If Hesperus and Phosophorus are the same, they can't possibly be different
[Kripke]
|
17031
|
A name can still refer even if it satisfies none of its well-known descriptions
[Kripke]
|
17034
|
Analyses of concepts using entirely different terms are very inclined to fail
[Kripke]
|
17030
|
Important properties of an object need not be essential to it
[Kripke]
|
17036
|
Identity statements can be contingent if they rely on descriptions
[Kripke]
|
17037
|
Physical necessity may be necessity in the highest degree
[Kripke]
|
17046
|
Could the actual Queen have been born of different parents?
[Kripke]
|
4959
|
A name's reference is not fixed by any marks or properties of the referent
[Kripke]
|
17055
|
Atomic number 79 is part of the nature of the gold we know
[Kripke]
|
17047
|
If we imagine this table made of ice or different wood, we are imagining a different table
[Kripke]
|
17045
|
De re modality is an object having essential properties
[Kripke]
|
9387
|
The scientific discovery (if correct) that gold has atomic number 79 is a necessary truth
[Kripke]
|
17054
|
Scientific discoveries about gold are necessary truths
[Kripke]
|
17057
|
Once we've found that heat is molecular motion, then that's what it is, in all possible worlds
[Kripke]
|
4965
|
Science searches basic structures in search of essences
[Kripke]
|
17050
|
Tigers may lack all the properties we originally used to identify them
[Kripke]
|
17049
|
'Tiger' designates a species, and merely looking like the species is not enough
[Kripke]
|
17051
|
The original concept of 'cat' comes from paradigmatic instances
[Kripke]
|
17056
|
Terms for natural kinds are very close to proper names
[Kripke]
|
4963
|
The properties that fix reference are contingent, the properties involving meaning are necessary
[Kripke]
|
4964
|
'Cats are animals' has turned out to be a necessary truth
[Kripke]
|
17053
|
Gold's atomic number might not be 79, but if it is, could non-79 stuff be gold?
[Kripke]
|
4967
|
It seems logically possible to have the pain brain state without the actual pain
[Kripke]
|
5832
|
Identity must be necessary, but pain isn't necessarily a brain state, so they aren't identical
[Kripke, by Schwartz,SP]
|
4968
|
Identity theorists seem committed to no-brain-event-no-pain, and vice versa, which seems wrong
[Kripke]
|
17048
|
Analytic judgements are a priori, even when their content is empirical
[Kripke]
|
4961
|
It is a necessary truth that Elizabeth II was the child of two particular parents
[Kripke]
|
4960
|
"'Hesperus' is 'Phosphorus'" is necessarily true, if it is true, but not known a priori
[Kripke]
|
4966
|
Theoretical identities are between rigid designators, and so are necessary a posteriori
[Kripke]
|
8274
|
Socrates can't have a necessary origin, because he might have had no 'origin'
[Lowe on Kripke]
|
14893
|
Rigid designation creates a puzzle - why do some necessary truths appear to be contingent?
[Kripke, by Maciŕ/Garcia-Carpentiro]
|
17059
|
Unicorns are vague, so no actual or possible creature could count as a unicorn
[Kripke]
|
17058
|
What many people consider merely physically necessary I consider completely necessary
[Kripke]
|
4970
|
What is often held to be mere physical necessity is actually metaphysical necessity
[Kripke]
|
9221
|
The best known objection to counterparts is Kripke's, that Humphrey doesn't care if his counterpart wins
[Kripke, by Sider]
|
4950
|
Possible worlds are useful in set theory, but can be very misleading elsewhere
[Kripke]
|
16999
|
A vague identity may seem intransitive, and we might want to talk of 'counterparts'
[Kripke]
|
17000
|
We might fix identities for small particulars, but it is utopian to hope for such things
[Kripke]
|
17003
|
Kaplan's 'Dthat' is a useful operator for transforming a description into a rigid designation
[Kripke]
|
4956
|
A description may fix a reference even when it is not true of its object
[Kripke]
|
17032
|
Even if Gödel didn't produce his theorems, he's still called 'Gödel'
[Kripke]
|
17044
|
A relation can clearly be reflexive, and identity is the smallest reflexive relation
[Kripke]
|
11868
|
A different piece of wood could have been used for that table; constitution isn't identity
[Wiggins on Kripke]
|
17052
|
The a priori analytic truths involving fixing of reference are contingent
[Kripke]
|
4969
|
I regard the mind-body problem as wide open, and extremely confusing
[Kripke]
|
16981
|
With the necessity of self-identity plus Leibniz's Law, identity has to be an 'internal' relation
[Kripke]
|
4942
|
The indiscernibility of identicals is as self-evident as the law of contradiction
[Kripke]
|
16982
|
A man has two names if the historical chains are different - even if they are the same!
[Kripke]
|
9385
|
The very act of designating of an object with properties gives knowledge of a contingent truth
[Kripke]
|
4943
|
Instead of talking about possible worlds, we can always say "It is possible that.."
[Kripke]
|
16983
|
Probability with dice uses possible worlds, abstractions which fictionally simplify things
[Kripke]
|
16984
|
I don't think possible worlds reductively reveal the natures of modal operators etc.
[Kripke]
|
16985
|
Possible worlds allowed the application of set-theoretic models to modal logic
[Kripke]
|
16328
|
Kripke classified fixed points, and illuminated their use for clarifications
[Kripke, by Halbach]
|
15327
|
Kripke's semantic theory has actually inspired promising axiomatic theories
[Kripke, by Horsten]
|
15343
|
Kripke offers a semantic theory of truth (involving models)
[Kripke, by Horsten]
|
14967
|
Certain three-valued languages can contain their own truth predicates
[Kripke, by Gupta]
|
14966
|
The Tarskian move to a metalanguage may not be essential for truth theories
[Kripke, by Gupta]
|
16383
|
Puzzled Pierre has two mental files about the same object
[Recanati on Kripke]
|
10792
|
The substitutional quantifier is not in competition with the standard interpretation
[Kripke, by Marcus (Barcan)]
|
7305
|
Kripke's Wittgenstein says meaning 'vanishes into thin air'
[Kripke, by Miller,A]
|
11075
|
The sceptical rule-following paradox is the basis of the private language argument
[Kripke, by Hanna]
|
11076
|
Community implies assertability-conditions rather than truth-conditions semantics
[Kripke, by Hanna]
|
19270
|
If you ask what is in your mind for following the addition rule, meaning just seems to vanish
[Kripke]
|
19269
|
'Quus' means the same as 'plus' if the ingredients are less than 57; otherwise it just produces 5
[Kripke]
|
19271
|
No rule can be fully explained
[Kripke]
|