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Single Idea 17047

[filed under theme 9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object ]

Full Idea

Though we can imagine a table identical to this one in this room, but made of ice (or different wood), it seems to me that this is not to imagine this table as made of ice, but to imagine another table, resembling this one, made of ice.

Gist of Idea

If we imagine this table made of ice or different wood, we are imagining a different table

Source

Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970], Lecture 3)

Book Ref

Kripke,Saul: 'Naming and Necessity' [Blackwell 1980], p.114

A Reaction

This is the Necessity of Constitution thesis, which I doubt. Might this table have had one leg different? Why not? Then you have a Ship of Theseus question. How much could be different? How much of the constitution is necessary?

The 21 ideas with the same theme [objects should be understood as what they are made of]:

16066 Additional or removal of any part changes a thing, so people are never the same person [Epicharmus]
6019 If someone squashed a horse to make a dog, something new would now exist [Mnesarchus]
16995 Given that a table is made of molecules, could it not be molecular and still be this table? [Kripke]
17047 If we imagine this table made of ice or different wood, we are imagining a different table [Kripke]
11868 A different piece of wood could have been used for that table; constitution isn't identity [Wiggins on Kripke]
14264 Is there a plausible Aristotelian notion of constitution, applicable to both physical and non-physical? [Fine,K]
14267 There is no distinctive idea of constitution, because you can't say constitution begins and ends [Fine,K]
16076 Constitution is not identity, as consideration of essential predicates shows [Rudder Baker]
16081 The constitution view gives a unified account of the relation of persons/bodies, statues/bronze etc [Rudder Baker]
16082 Statues essentially have relational properties lacked by lumps [Rudder Baker]
16228 The constitution theory is endurantism plus more than one object in a place [Hawley]
16229 Constitution theory needs sortal properties like 'being a sweater' to distinguish it from its thread [Hawley]
14492 If the constitution view says thread and sweater are two things, why do we talk of one thing? [Hawley]
15848 Mereology treats constitution as a criterion of identity, as shown in the axiom of extensionality [Harte,V]
6130 'Composition' says things are their parts; 'constitution' says a whole substance is an object [Merricks]
6138 It seems wrong that constitution entails that two objects are wholly co-located [Merricks]
12867 A hand constitutes a fist (when clenched), but a fist is not composed of an augmented hand [Simons]
13279 There are at least six versions of constitution being identity [Koslicki]
16065 Constitution is identity (being in the same place), or it isn't (having different possibilities) [Wasserman]
16067 Constitution is not identity, because it is an asymmetric dependence relation [Wasserman]
16069 There are three main objections to seeing constitution as different from identity [Wasserman]