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Single Idea 1705
[filed under theme 19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
]
Full Idea
It is not necessary that of every affirmation and opposite negation one should be true and the other false. For what holds for things that are does not hold for things that are not but may possibly be or not be.
Gist of Idea
It doesn't have to be the case that in opposed views one is true and the other false
Source
Aristotle (On Interpretation [c.330 BCE], 19a39)
Book Ref
Aristotle: 'Categories and De Interpretatione', ed/tr. Ackrill,J.R. [OUP 1963], p.53
A Reaction
Thus even if Bivalence holds, and the only truth-values are T and F, it doesn't follow that Excluded Middle holds, which says that every proposition must have one of those two values.
The
19 ideas
from 'On Interpretation'
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22272
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Aristotle's later logic had to treat 'Socrates' as 'everything that is Socrates'
[Potter on Aristotle]
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2337
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For Aristotle meaning and reference are linked to concepts
[Aristotle, by Putnam]
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13763
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Spoken sounds vary between people, but are signs of affections of soul, which are the same for all
[Aristotle]
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1701
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A prayer is a sentence which is neither true nor false
[Aristotle]
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1702
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Things may be necessary once they occur, but not be unconditionally necessary
[Aristotle]
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1703
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It is necessary that either a sea-fight occurs tomorrow or it doesn't, though neither option is in itself necessary
[Aristotle]
|
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21593
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In talking of future sea-fights, Aristotle rejects bivalence
[Aristotle, by Williamson]
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1704
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Statements are true according to how things actually are
[Aristotle]
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1705
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It doesn't have to be the case that in opposed views one is true and the other false
[Aristotle]
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1706
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Non-existent things aren't made to exist by thought, because their non-existence is part of the thought
[Aristotle]
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1707
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Maybe necessity and non-necessity are the first principles of ontology
[Aristotle]
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1708
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In "Callias is just/not just/unjust", which of these are contraries?
[Aristotle]
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9405
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Square of Opposition: not both true, or not both false; one-way implication; opposite truth-values
[Aristotle]
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9728
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Modal Square 1: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'contraries' of □¬P and ¬◊P
[Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
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9729
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Modal Square 2: ¬□¬P and ◊P are 'subcontraries' of ¬□P and ◊¬P
[Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
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9730
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Modal Square 3: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'contradictories' of ¬□P and ◊¬P
[Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
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9731
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Modal Square 4: □¬P and ¬◊P are 'contradictories' of ¬□¬P and ◊P
[Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
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9732
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Modal Square 5: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'subalternatives' of ¬□¬P and ◊P
[Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
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9733
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Modal Square 6: □¬P and ¬◊P are 'subalternatives' of ¬□P and ◊¬P
[Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
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