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Single Idea 17052
[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
]
Full Idea
If statements whose a priori truth is known via the fixing of a reference are counted as analytic, then some analytic truths are contingent.
Gist of Idea
The a priori analytic truths involving fixing of reference are contingent
Source
Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity notes and addenda [1972], note 63)
Book Ref
Kripke,Saul: 'Naming and Necessity' [Blackwell 1980], p.122
The
14 ideas
from 'Naming and Necessity notes and addenda'
17059
|
Unicorns are vague, so no actual or possible creature could count as a unicorn
[Kripke]
|
17058
|
What many people consider merely physically necessary I consider completely necessary
[Kripke]
|
4970
|
What is often held to be mere physical necessity is actually metaphysical necessity
[Kripke]
|
9221
|
The best known objection to counterparts is Kripke's, that Humphrey doesn't care if his counterpart wins
[Kripke, by Sider]
|
4950
|
Possible worlds are useful in set theory, but can be very misleading elsewhere
[Kripke]
|
17000
|
We might fix identities for small particulars, but it is utopian to hope for such things
[Kripke]
|
16999
|
A vague identity may seem intransitive, and we might want to talk of 'counterparts'
[Kripke]
|
17003
|
Kaplan's 'Dthat' is a useful operator for transforming a description into a rigid designation
[Kripke]
|
4956
|
A description may fix a reference even when it is not true of its object
[Kripke]
|
17032
|
Even if Gödel didn't produce his theorems, he's still called 'Gödel'
[Kripke]
|
17044
|
A relation can clearly be reflexive, and identity is the smallest reflexive relation
[Kripke]
|
11868
|
A different piece of wood could have been used for that table; constitution isn't identity
[Wiggins on Kripke]
|
17052
|
The a priori analytic truths involving fixing of reference are contingent
[Kripke]
|
4969
|
I regard the mind-body problem as wide open, and extremely confusing
[Kripke]
|