more from this thinker     |     more from this text


Single Idea 17081

[filed under theme 14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation ]

Full Idea

Plato, Aristotle, Mill and Hempel believed that an explanatory product can be characterized solely in terms of the kind of information it conveys, no reference to the act of explaining being required.

Gist of Idea

Usually explanations just involve giving information, with no reference to the act of explanation

Source

David-Hillel Ruben (Explaining Explanation [1990], Ch 1)

Book Ref

Ruben,David-Hillel: 'Explaining Explanation' [Routledge 1990], p.7


A Reaction

Achinstein says it's about acts, because the same information could be an explanation, or a critique, or some other act. Ruben disagrees, and so do I.


The 18 ideas with the same theme [general ideas about the concept of explanation]:

Universal principles are not primary beings, but particular principles are not universally knowable [Aristotle]
What is most universal is furthest away, and the particulars are nearest [Aristotle]
Universals are valuable because they make the explanations plain [Aristotle]
Are particulars explained more by universals, or by other particulars? [Aristotle]
Aristotelian explanations are facts, while modern explanations depend on human conceptions [Aristotle, by Politis]
All knowledge and explanation rests on the inexplicable [Schopenhauer]
Surprisingly, empiricists before Mill ignore explanation, which seems to transcend experience [Mill, by Ruben]
Explanations have states of affairs as their objects [Chisholm]
Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson]
Explanatory exclusion: there cannot be two separate complete explanations of a single event [Kim]
Usually explanations just involve giving information, with no reference to the act of explanation [Ruben]
Hume allows interpolation, even though it and extrapolation are not actually valid [Molnar]
Explanation may describe induction, but may not show how it justifies, or leads to truth [Lipton]
Explanations must cite generalisations [Sider]
People tend to be satisfied with shallow explanations [Gelman]
We talk both of 'people' explaining things, and of 'facts' explaining things [Bird]
The objective component of explanations is the things that must exist for the explanation [Bird]
'Because' can signal an inference rather than an explanation [Liggins]