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Single Idea 17086

[filed under theme 14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation ]

Full Idea

It is surprising that no empiricist philosopher before Mill turned in an explicit way to the scrutiny of the concept of explanation, which had …every appearance of being experience-transcendent.

Gist of Idea

Surprisingly, empiricists before Mill ignore explanation, which seems to transcend experience

Source

report of John Stuart Mill (System of Logic [1843]) by David-Hillel Ruben - Explaining Explanation Ch 4

Book Ref

Ruben,David-Hillel: 'Explaining Explanation' [Routledge 1990], p.112


A Reaction

Yes indeed! This is why explanation is absolutely basic, to philosophy and to human understanding. The whole of philosophy is a quest for explanations, so to be strictly empirical about it strikes me as crazy.


The 18 ideas with the same theme [general ideas about the concept of explanation]:

Universal principles are not primary beings, but particular principles are not universally knowable [Aristotle]
What is most universal is furthest away, and the particulars are nearest [Aristotle]
Universals are valuable because they make the explanations plain [Aristotle]
Are particulars explained more by universals, or by other particulars? [Aristotle]
Aristotelian explanations are facts, while modern explanations depend on human conceptions [Aristotle, by Politis]
All knowledge and explanation rests on the inexplicable [Schopenhauer]
Surprisingly, empiricists before Mill ignore explanation, which seems to transcend experience [Mill, by Ruben]
Explanations have states of affairs as their objects [Chisholm]
Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson]
Explanatory exclusion: there cannot be two separate complete explanations of a single event [Kim]
Usually explanations just involve giving information, with no reference to the act of explanation [Ruben]
Hume allows interpolation, even though it and extrapolation are not actually valid [Molnar]
Explanation may describe induction, but may not show how it justifies, or leads to truth [Lipton]
Explanations must cite generalisations [Sider]
People tend to be satisfied with shallow explanations [Gelman]
We talk both of 'people' explaining things, and of 'facts' explaining things [Bird]
The objective component of explanations is the things that must exist for the explanation [Bird]
'Because' can signal an inference rather than an explanation [Liggins]