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Single Idea 17182

[filed under theme 10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence ]

Full Idea

A thing is called necessary either in reference to its essence or its cause.

Gist of Idea

Necessity is in reference to essence or to cause

Source

Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], I Pr 33)

Book Ref

Spinoza,Benedict de: 'Ethics', ed/tr. White,WH/Stirling,AH [Wordsworth 2001], p.31


A Reaction

I like any proposal that necessity should be 'in reference to' something, rather than being free-standing. I like to add necessary 'for' something, which is often conceptual necessity. Roots are necessary for trees.


The 17 ideas with the same theme [necessity comes from the essence of actual things]:

The two right angles of a triangle necessitate that a quadrilateral has four [Aristotle]
Some things have external causes of their necessity; others (the simple) generate necessities [Aristotle]
Aristotle's says necessary truths are distinct and derive from essential truths [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
Necessity is in reference to essence or to cause [Spinoza]
Metaphysical necessities are true in virtue of the essences of things [Ellis]
Individual essences necessitate that individual; natural kind essences necessitate kind membership [Ellis]
Socrates is necessarily distinct from the Eiffel Tower, but that is not part of his essence [Fine,K]
Metaphysical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all objects [Fine,K]
It is the nature of Socrates to be a man, so necessarily he is a man [Fine,K]
Essentialism is often identified with belief in 'de re' necessary truths [Mautner]
If basic physics has natures, then why not reality itself? That would then found the deepest necessities [Heil]
If an essence implies p, then p is an essential truth, and hence metaphysically necessary [Lowe]
Metaphysical necessity is either an essential truth, or rests on essential truths [Lowe]
The big challenge for essentialist views of modality is things having necessary existence [Hale]
Essentialism doesn't explain necessity reductively; it explains all necessities in terms of a few basic natures [Hale]
If necessity derives from essences, how do we explain the necessary existence of essences? [Hale]
We can base counterfactuals on powers, not possible worlds, and hence define necessity [Jacobs]