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Single Idea 17208
[filed under theme 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
]
Full Idea
A horse would as much be destroyed if it were changed into a man as if it were changed into an insect.
Gist of Idea
A horse would be destroyed if it were changed into a man or an insect
Source
Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], IV Pref)
Book Ref
Spinoza,Benedict de: 'Ethics', ed/tr. White,WH/Stirling,AH [Wordsworth 2001], p.163
A Reaction
He has been referring to essences of things. What if a shire horse is changed into a Shetland pony? If you watched the horse transmute, it would be continuous in a way that two separate creatures are not. Some sort of sameness there.
The
31 ideas
with the same theme
[can possible things be the same as actual things?]:
17208
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A horse would be destroyed if it were changed into a man or an insect
[Spinoza]
|
12904
|
If varieties of myself can be conceived of as distinct from me, then they are not me
[Leibniz]
|
11981
|
If someone's life went differently, then that would be another individual
[Leibniz]
|
11027
|
To know an object you must know all its possible occurrences
[Wittgenstein]
|
23465
|
The 'form' of an object is its possible roles in facts
[Wittgenstein]
|
12443
|
Can an unactualized possible have self-identity, and be distinct from other possibles?
[Quine]
|
9203
|
We can't quantify in modal contexts, because the modality depends on descriptions, not objects
[Quine, by Fine,K]
|
11965
|
Could possible Adam gradually transform into Noah, and vice versa?
[Chisholm]
|
14651
|
What Socrates could have been, and could have become, are different?
[Plantinga]
|
16993
|
If we discuss what might have happened to Nixon, we stipulate that it is about Nixon
[Kripke]
|
16998
|
Transworld identification is unproblematic, because we stipulate that we rigidly refer to something
[Kripke]
|
17001
|
A table in some possible world should not even be identified by its essential properties
[Kripke]
|
4952
|
Identification across possible worlds does not need properties, even essential ones
[Kripke]
|
11982
|
If possible Socrates differs from actual Socrates, the Indiscernibility of Identicals says they are different
[Plantinga]
|
11983
|
It doesn't matter that we can't identify the possible Socrates; we can't identify adults from baby photos
[Plantinga]
|
11985
|
If individuals can only exist in one world, then they can never lack any of their properties
[Plantinga]
|
11971
|
The simplest solution to transworld identification is to adopt bare particulars
[Kaplan]
|
12765
|
Why imagine that Babe Ruth might be a billiard ball; nothing useful could be said about the ball
[Stalnaker]
|
14072
|
Possible worlds identity needs a sortal
[Gibbard]
|
14078
|
Only concepts, not individuals, can be the same across possible worlds
[Gibbard]
|
12011
|
Transworld identity concerns the limits of possibility for ordinary things
[Forbes,G]
|
12016
|
The problem of transworld identity can be solved by individual essences
[Forbes,G]
|
13725
|
□ must be sensitive as to whether it picks out an object by essential or by contingent properties
[Fitting/Mendelsohn]
|
13731
|
Objects retain their possible properties across worlds, so a bundle theory of them seems best
[Fitting/Mendelsohn]
|
15377
|
Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds
[Fitting]
|
13081
|
Even extreme modal realists might allow transworld identity for abstract objects
[Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
|
12235
|
Necessity of identity seems trivial, because it leaves out the real essence
[Oderberg]
|
13717
|
Transworld identity is not a problem in de dicto sentences, which needn't identify an individual
[Sider]
|
15176
|
The individuals and kinds involved in modality are also a matter of convention
[Sidelle]
|
12889
|
The limits of change for an individual depend on the kind of individual
[Simons]
|
11887
|
Transworld identity without individual essences leads to 'bare identities'
[Mackie,P]
|