more from this thinker     |     more from this text


Single Idea 17216

[filed under theme 16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self ]

Full Idea

Sometimes a man undergoes such changes that he cannot very well be said to be the same man, as was the case with a certain Spanish poet ...who was so oblivious of his past life that he did not believe the tales and tragedies he had composed were his own.

Gist of Idea

The poet who forgot his own tragedies was no longer the same man

Source

Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], IV Pr 39)

Book Ref

Spinoza,Benedict de: 'Ethics', ed/tr. White,WH/Stirling,AH [Wordsworth 2001], p.193


A Reaction

This seems to need Locke's distinction between 'man' and 'person', since the poor poet was clearly the same human being. Spinoza places huge emphasis on the intellect as the essence of the man.


The 21 ideas with the same theme [relationship between the sense of Self and memories]:

Without memory I could not even speak of myself [Augustine]
The poet who forgot his own tragedies was no longer the same man [Spinoza]
Personal identity is my perceptions, but not my memory, as I forget too much [Ayer on Locke]
Locke's theory confusingly tries to unite consciousness and memory [Reid on Locke]
Locke mistakes similarity of a memory to its original event for identity [Reid on Locke]
Identity over time involves remembering actions just as they happened [Locke]
Should we punish people who commit crimes in their sleep? [Locke]
If a person's memories became totally those of the King of China, he would be the King of China [Leibniz]
Memory doesn't make identity; a man who relearned everything would still be the same man [Leibniz]
If consciousness of events makes our identity, then if we have forgotten them we didn't exist then [Butler]
Memory only reveals personal identity, by showing cause and effect [Hume]
We use memory to infer personal actions we have since forgotten [Hume]
Memory not only reveals identity, but creates it, by producing resemblances [Hume]
Who thinks that because you have forgotten an incident you are no longer that person? [Hume]
The identity of a thief is only known by similarity, but memory gives certainty in our own case [Reid]
It is theoretically possible that the Ego consists entirely of false memories [Sartre]
Not all exerience can be remembered, as this would produce an infinite regress [Ayer]
Memory is the best proposal as what unites bundles of experiences [Ayer]
If memory is the sole criterion of identity, we ought to use it for other people too [Shoemaker]
Bodily identity is one criterion and memory another, for personal identity [Shoemaker, by PG]
If a person relies on their notes, those notes are parted of the extended system which is the person [Clark/Chalmers]