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Single Idea 17272

[filed under theme 7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding ]

Full Idea

It is necessary that if it is snowing then 2+2=4, but the fact that 2+2=4 does not obtain in virtue of the fact that it is snowing.

Gist of Idea

2+2=4 is necessary if it is snowing, but not true in virtue of the fact that it is snowing

Source

Kit Fine (Guide to Ground [2012], 1.01)

Book Ref

'Metaphysical Grounding', ed/tr. Correia,F/Schnieder,B [CUP 2012], p.38

A Reaction

Critics dislike 'in virtue of' (as vacuous), but I can't see how you can disagree with this obvervation of Fine's. You can hardly eliminate the word 'because' from English, or say p is because of some object. We demand the right to keep asking 'why?'!

The 21 ideas from 'Guide to Ground'

17271 Is there metaphysical explanation (as well as causal), involving a constitutive form of determination? [Fine,K]
17272 2+2=4 is necessary if it is snowing, but not true in virtue of the fact that it is snowing [Fine,K]
17273 Each basic modality has its 'own' explanatory relation [Fine,K]
17279 Even a three-dimensionalist might identify temporal parts, in their thinking [Fine,K]
17281 If grounding is a relation it must be between entities of the same type, preferably between facts [Fine,K]
17280 Ground is best understood as a sentence operator, rather than a relation between predicates [Fine,K]
17274 Philosophical explanation is largely by ground (just as cause is used in science) [Fine,K]
17278 We can only explain how a reduction is possible if we accept the concept of ground [Fine,K]
17276 If you say one thing causes another, that leaves open that the 'other' has its own distinct reality [Fine,K]
17275 Realist metaphysics concerns what is real; naive metaphysics concerns natures of things [Fine,K]
17277 If mind supervenes on the physical, it may also explain the physical (and not vice versa) [Fine,K]
17282 Truths need not always have their source in what exists [Fine,K]
17283 If the truth-making relation is modal, then modal truths will be grounded in anything [Fine,K]
17284 An immediate ground is the next lower level, which gives the concept of a hierarchy [Fine,K]
17285 'Strict' ground moves down the explanations, but 'weak' ground can move sideways [Fine,K]
17286 Logical consequence is verification by a possible world within a truth-set [Fine,K]
17287 Facts, such as redness and roundness of a ball, can be 'fused' into one fact [Fine,K]
17291 We explain by identity (what it is), or by truth (how things are) [Fine,K]
17289 Every necessary truth is grounded in the nature of something [Fine,K]
17290 Only metaphysical grounding must be explained by essence [Fine,K]
17288 We learn grounding from what is grounded, not what does the grounding [Fine,K]