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Single Idea 17276
[filed under theme 7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
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Full Idea
It will not do to say that the physical is causally determinative of the mental, since that leaves open the possibility that the mental has a distinct reality over and above that of the physical.
Gist of Idea
If you say one thing causes another, that leaves open that the 'other' has its own distinct reality
Source
Kit Fine (Guide to Ground [2012], 1.02)
Book Ref
'Metaphysical Grounding', ed/tr. Correia,F/Schnieder,B [CUP 2012], p.41
A Reaction
The context is a defence of grounding, so that if we say the mind is 'grounded' in the brain, we are saying rather more than merely that it is caused by the brain. A ghost might be 'caused' by a bar of soap. Nice.
The
21 ideas
from 'Guide to Ground'
17271
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Is there metaphysical explanation (as well as causal), involving a constitutive form of determination?
[Fine,K]
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17273
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Each basic modality has its 'own' explanatory relation
[Fine,K]
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17272
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2+2=4 is necessary if it is snowing, but not true in virtue of the fact that it is snowing
[Fine,K]
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17276
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If you say one thing causes another, that leaves open that the 'other' has its own distinct reality
[Fine,K]
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17281
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If grounding is a relation it must be between entities of the same type, preferably between facts
[Fine,K]
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17280
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Ground is best understood as a sentence operator, rather than a relation between predicates
[Fine,K]
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17274
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Philosophical explanation is largely by ground (just as cause is used in science)
[Fine,K]
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17278
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We can only explain how a reduction is possible if we accept the concept of ground
[Fine,K]
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17275
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Realist metaphysics concerns what is real; naive metaphysics concerns natures of things
[Fine,K]
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17277
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If mind supervenes on the physical, it may also explain the physical (and not vice versa)
[Fine,K]
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17279
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Even a three-dimensionalist might identify temporal parts, in their thinking
[Fine,K]
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17282
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Truths need not always have their source in what exists
[Fine,K]
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17283
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If the truth-making relation is modal, then modal truths will be grounded in anything
[Fine,K]
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17284
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An immediate ground is the next lower level, which gives the concept of a hierarchy
[Fine,K]
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17285
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'Strict' ground moves down the explanations, but 'weak' ground can move sideways
[Fine,K]
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17287
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Facts, such as redness and roundness of a ball, can be 'fused' into one fact
[Fine,K]
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17286
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Logical consequence is verification by a possible world within a truth-set
[Fine,K]
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17290
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Only metaphysical grounding must be explained by essence
[Fine,K]
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17289
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Every necessary truth is grounded in the nature of something
[Fine,K]
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17288
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We learn grounding from what is grounded, not what does the grounding
[Fine,K]
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17291
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We explain by identity (what it is), or by truth (how things are)
[Fine,K]
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