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Single Idea 17278
[filed under theme 7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / d. Grounding and reduction
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Full Idea
It is only by embracing the concept of a ground as a metaphysical form of explanation in its own right that one can adequately explain how a reduction of the reality of one thing to another should be understood.
Gist of Idea
We can only explain how a reduction is possible if we accept the concept of ground
Source
Kit Fine (Guide to Ground [2012], 1.02)
Book Ref
'Metaphysical Grounding', ed/tr. Correia,F/Schnieder,B [CUP 2012], p.41
A Reaction
I love that we are aiming to say 'how' a reduction should be understood, and not just 'that' it exists. I'm not sure about Fine's emphasis on explaining 'realities', when I think we are after more like structural relations or interconnected facts.
The
21 ideas
from 'Guide to Ground'
17271
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Is there metaphysical explanation (as well as causal), involving a constitutive form of determination?
[Fine,K]
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17273
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Each basic modality has its 'own' explanatory relation
[Fine,K]
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17272
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2+2=4 is necessary if it is snowing, but not true in virtue of the fact that it is snowing
[Fine,K]
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17276
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If you say one thing causes another, that leaves open that the 'other' has its own distinct reality
[Fine,K]
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17281
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If grounding is a relation it must be between entities of the same type, preferably between facts
[Fine,K]
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17280
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Ground is best understood as a sentence operator, rather than a relation between predicates
[Fine,K]
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17274
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Philosophical explanation is largely by ground (just as cause is used in science)
[Fine,K]
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17278
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We can only explain how a reduction is possible if we accept the concept of ground
[Fine,K]
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17275
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Realist metaphysics concerns what is real; naive metaphysics concerns natures of things
[Fine,K]
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17277
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If mind supervenes on the physical, it may also explain the physical (and not vice versa)
[Fine,K]
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17279
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Even a three-dimensionalist might identify temporal parts, in their thinking
[Fine,K]
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17282
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Truths need not always have their source in what exists
[Fine,K]
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17283
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If the truth-making relation is modal, then modal truths will be grounded in anything
[Fine,K]
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17284
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An immediate ground is the next lower level, which gives the concept of a hierarchy
[Fine,K]
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17285
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'Strict' ground moves down the explanations, but 'weak' ground can move sideways
[Fine,K]
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17287
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Facts, such as redness and roundness of a ball, can be 'fused' into one fact
[Fine,K]
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17286
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Logical consequence is verification by a possible world within a truth-set
[Fine,K]
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17290
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Only metaphysical grounding must be explained by essence
[Fine,K]
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17289
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Every necessary truth is grounded in the nature of something
[Fine,K]
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17288
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We learn grounding from what is grounded, not what does the grounding
[Fine,K]
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17291
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We explain by identity (what it is), or by truth (how things are)
[Fine,K]
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