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Single Idea 17281
[filed under theme 7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
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Full Idea
In so far as ground is regarded as a relation it should be between entities of the same type, and the entities should probably be taken as worldly entities, such as facts, rather than as representational entities, such as propositions.
Gist of Idea
If grounding is a relation it must be between entities of the same type, preferably between facts
Source
Kit Fine (Guide to Ground [2012], 1.02)
Book Ref
'Metaphysical Grounding', ed/tr. Correia,F/Schnieder,B [CUP 2012], p.43
A Reaction
That's more like it (cf. Idea 17280). The consensus of this discussion seems to point to facts as the best relata, for all the vagueness of facts, and the big question of how fine-grained facts should be (and how dependent they are on descriptions).
Related Idea
Idea 17280
Ground is best understood as a sentence operator, rather than a relation between predicates [Fine,K]
The
21 ideas
from 'Guide to Ground'
17271
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Is there metaphysical explanation (as well as causal), involving a constitutive form of determination?
[Fine,K]
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17273
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Each basic modality has its 'own' explanatory relation
[Fine,K]
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17272
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2+2=4 is necessary if it is snowing, but not true in virtue of the fact that it is snowing
[Fine,K]
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17276
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If you say one thing causes another, that leaves open that the 'other' has its own distinct reality
[Fine,K]
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17281
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If grounding is a relation it must be between entities of the same type, preferably between facts
[Fine,K]
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17280
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Ground is best understood as a sentence operator, rather than a relation between predicates
[Fine,K]
|
17274
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Philosophical explanation is largely by ground (just as cause is used in science)
[Fine,K]
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17278
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We can only explain how a reduction is possible if we accept the concept of ground
[Fine,K]
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17275
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Realist metaphysics concerns what is real; naive metaphysics concerns natures of things
[Fine,K]
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17277
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If mind supervenes on the physical, it may also explain the physical (and not vice versa)
[Fine,K]
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17279
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Even a three-dimensionalist might identify temporal parts, in their thinking
[Fine,K]
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17282
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Truths need not always have their source in what exists
[Fine,K]
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17283
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If the truth-making relation is modal, then modal truths will be grounded in anything
[Fine,K]
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17284
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An immediate ground is the next lower level, which gives the concept of a hierarchy
[Fine,K]
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17285
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'Strict' ground moves down the explanations, but 'weak' ground can move sideways
[Fine,K]
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17287
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Facts, such as redness and roundness of a ball, can be 'fused' into one fact
[Fine,K]
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17286
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Logical consequence is verification by a possible world within a truth-set
[Fine,K]
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17290
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Only metaphysical grounding must be explained by essence
[Fine,K]
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17289
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Every necessary truth is grounded in the nature of something
[Fine,K]
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17288
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We learn grounding from what is grounded, not what does the grounding
[Fine,K]
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17291
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We explain by identity (what it is), or by truth (how things are)
[Fine,K]
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