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Single Idea 17282

[filed under theme 3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism ]

Full Idea

There is no reason in principle why the ultimate source of what is true should always lie in what exists.

Gist of Idea

Truths need not always have their source in what exists

Source

Kit Fine (Guide to Ground [2012], 1.03)

Book Ref

'Metaphysical Grounding', ed/tr. Correia,F/Schnieder,B [CUP 2012], p.44

A Reaction

This seems to be the weak point of the truthmaker theory, since truths about non-existence are immediately in trouble. Saying reality makes things true is one thing, but picking out a specific bit of it for each truth is not so easy.

Related Idea

Idea 18877 Moral realism doesn't seem to entail the existence of any things [Cameron]

The 21 ideas from 'Guide to Ground'

17271 Is there metaphysical explanation (as well as causal), involving a constitutive form of determination? [Fine,K]
17272 2+2=4 is necessary if it is snowing, but not true in virtue of the fact that it is snowing [Fine,K]
17273 Each basic modality has its 'own' explanatory relation [Fine,K]
17279 Even a three-dimensionalist might identify temporal parts, in their thinking [Fine,K]
17281 If grounding is a relation it must be between entities of the same type, preferably between facts [Fine,K]
17280 Ground is best understood as a sentence operator, rather than a relation between predicates [Fine,K]
17274 Philosophical explanation is largely by ground (just as cause is used in science) [Fine,K]
17278 We can only explain how a reduction is possible if we accept the concept of ground [Fine,K]
17276 If you say one thing causes another, that leaves open that the 'other' has its own distinct reality [Fine,K]
17275 Realist metaphysics concerns what is real; naive metaphysics concerns natures of things [Fine,K]
17277 If mind supervenes on the physical, it may also explain the physical (and not vice versa) [Fine,K]
17282 Truths need not always have their source in what exists [Fine,K]
17283 If the truth-making relation is modal, then modal truths will be grounded in anything [Fine,K]
17284 An immediate ground is the next lower level, which gives the concept of a hierarchy [Fine,K]
17285 'Strict' ground moves down the explanations, but 'weak' ground can move sideways [Fine,K]
17286 Logical consequence is verification by a possible world within a truth-set [Fine,K]
17287 Facts, such as redness and roundness of a ball, can be 'fused' into one fact [Fine,K]
17291 We explain by identity (what it is), or by truth (how things are) [Fine,K]
17289 Every necessary truth is grounded in the nature of something [Fine,K]
17290 Only metaphysical grounding must be explained by essence [Fine,K]
17288 We learn grounding from what is grounded, not what does the grounding [Fine,K]