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Full Idea
The 'worldly' view of facts says they are obtaining states of affairs, individuated by their constituents and their combination. On the 'conceptual' view, facts will differ if they pick out an object or property via different concepts.
Gist of Idea
Worldly facts are obtaining states of affairs, with constituents; conceptual facts also depend on concepts
Source
Paul Audi (Clarification and Defense of Grounding [2012], 3.2)
Book Ref
'Metaphysical Grounding', ed/tr. Correia,F/Schnieder,B [CUP 2012], p.103
A Reaction
Might it be that conceptual differences between facts are supervenient on worldly differences (with the worldly facts in charge)?
Related Idea
Idea 17294 Grounding is a singular relation between worldly facts [Audi,P]
| 17292 | Avoid 'in virtue of' for grounding, since it might imply a reflexive relation such as identity [Audi,P] |
| 17295 | Ground relations depend on the properties [Audi,P] |
| 17294 | Grounding is a singular relation between worldly facts [Audi,P] |
| 17293 | Worldly facts are obtaining states of affairs, with constituents; conceptual facts also depend on concepts [Audi,P] |
| 17298 | Two things being identical (like water and H2O) is not an explanation [Audi,P] |
| 17299 | There are plenty of examples of non-causal explanation [Audi,P] |
| 17296 | We must accept grounding, for our important explanations [Audi,P] |
| 17297 | A ball's being spherical non-causally determines its power to roll [Audi,P] |
| 17300 | If grounding relates facts, properties must be included, as well as objects [Audi,P] |
| 17301 | Reduction is just identity, so the two things are the same fact, so reduction isn't grounding [Audi,P] |
| 17302 | Ground is irreflexive, asymmetric, transitive, non-monotonic etc. [Audi,P] |
| 17303 | The best critique of grounding says it is actually either identity or elimination [Audi,P] |