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Single Idea 17304

[filed under theme 7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding ]

Full Idea

Grounding is something like metaphysical causation. Just as causation links the world across time, grounding links the world across levels. Grounding connects the more fundamental to the less fundamental, and thereby backs a certain form of explanation.

Gist of Idea

As causation links across time, grounding links the world across levels

Source

Jonathan Schaffer (Grounding, Transitivity and Contrastivity [2012], Intro)

Book Ref

'Metaphysical Grounding', ed/tr. Correia,F/Schnieder,B [CUP 2012], p.122

A Reaction

Obviously you need 'levels' for this, which we should take to be structural levels.

The 54 ideas from Jonathan Schaffer

14599 Three types of reduction: Theoretical (of terms), Definitional (of concepts), Ontological (of reality) [Schaffer,J]
14600 Analysis aims at secure necessary and sufficient conditions [Schaffer,J]
14601 Individuation aims to count entities, by saying when there is one [Schaffer,J]
14603 'Reification' occurs if we mistake a concept for a thing [Schaffer,J]
14604 If a notion is ontologically basic, it should be needed in our best attempt at science [Schaffer,J]
14605 Tropes are the same as events [Schaffer,J]
14606 Only ideal conceivability could indicate what is possible [Schaffer,J]
14607 T adds □p→p for reflexivity, and is ideal for modeling lawhood [Schaffer,J]
14081 Identities can be true despite indeterminate reference, if true under all interpretations [Schaffer,J]
14082 No sortal could ever exactly pin down which set of particles count as this 'cup' [Schaffer,J]
17304 As causation links across time, grounding links the world across levels [Schaffer,J]
17306 If ground is transitive and irreflexive, it has a strict partial ordering, giving structure [Schaffer,J]
17305 I take what is fundamental to be the whole spatiotemporal manifold and its fields [Schaffer,J]
17307 Nowadays causation is usually understood in terms of equations and variable ranges [Schaffer,J]
17308 Explaining 'Adam ate the apple' depends on emphasis, and thus implies a contrast [Schaffer,J]
10359 In causation there are three problems of relata, and three metaphysical problems [Schaffer,J]
10361 Events are fairly course-grained (just saying 'hello'), unlike facts (like saying 'hello' loudly) [Schaffer,J]
10360 Causal relata are events - or facts, features, tropes, states, situations or aspects [Schaffer,J]
10362 One may defend three or four causal relata, as in 'c causes e rather than e*' [Schaffer,J]
10366 Causation transcends nature, because absences can cause things [Schaffer,J]
10367 There is only one fact - the True [Schaffer,J]
10372 Causation may not be transitive; the last event may follow from the first, but not be caused by it [Schaffer,J]
10368 If causal relata must be in nature and fine-grained, neither facts nor events will do [Schaffer,J]
10375 At least four rivals have challenged the view that causal direction is time direction [Schaffer,J]
10374 There are at least ten theories about causal connections [Schaffer,J]
10373 Logical form can't dictate metaphysics, as it may propose an undesirable property [Schaffer,J]
10376 The actual cause may make an event less likely than a possible more effective cause [Schaffer,J]
10377 Causation may not be a process, if a crucial part of the process is 'disconnected' [Schaffer,J]
10378 A causal process needs to be connected to the effect in the right way [Schaffer,J]
10382 Causation can't be a process, because a process needs causation as a primitive [Schaffer,J]
10381 All four probability versions of causation may need causation to be primitive [Schaffer,J]
10383 The relata of causation (such as events) need properties as explanation, which need causation! [Schaffer,J]
10380 Causation is primitive; it is too intractable and central to be reduced; all explanations require it [Schaffer,J]
10385 If causation is just observables, or part of common sense, or vacuous, it can't be primitive [Schaffer,J]
10387 The notion of causation allows understanding of science, without appearing in equations [Schaffer,J]
10388 Causation is utterly essential for numerous philosophical explanations [Schaffer,J]
10384 If two different causes are possible in one set of circumstances, causation is primitive [Schaffer,J]
10386 If causation is primitive, it can be experienced in ourselves, or inferred as best explanation [Schaffer,J]
10389 Causal order must be temporal, or else causes could be blocked, and time couldn't be explained [Schaffer,J]
10390 Causal order is not temporal, because of time travel, and simultanous, joint or backward causes [Schaffer,J]
10393 Our selection of 'the' cause is very predictable, so must have a basis [Schaffer,J]
10394 Selecting 'the' cause must have a basis; there is no causation without such a selection [Schaffer,J]
13734 Modern Quinean metaphysics is about what exists, but Aristotelian metaphysics asks about grounding [Schaffer,J]
13739 Maybe categories are just the different ways that things depend on basic substances [Schaffer,J]
13743 We should not multiply basic entities, but we can have as many derivative entities as we like [Schaffer,J]
13741 If 'there are red roses' implies 'there are roses', then 'there are prime numbers' implies 'there are numbers' [Schaffer,J]
13744 The cosmos is the only fundamental entity, from which all else exists by abstraction [Schaffer,J]
13740 'Moorean certainties' are more credible than any sceptical argument [Schaffer,J]
13742 There exist heaps with no integral unity, so we should accept arbitrary composites in the same way [Schaffer,J]
13747 Supervenience is just modal correlation [Schaffer,J]
13748 Grounding is unanalysable and primitive, and is the basic structuring concept in metaphysics [Schaffer,J]
13751 If you tore the metaphysics out of philosophy, the whole enterprise would collapse [Schaffer,J]
13749 Belief in impossible worlds may require dialetheism [Schaffer,J]
13752 The notion of 'grounding' can explain integrated wholes in a way that mere aggregates can't [Schaffer,J]