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Full Idea
Fine assumes that essences can be identified with collections of propositions that are true in virtue of the identity of a particular object, or objects. ...There is not, on this approach, much of a distinction between essences and real definitions.
Gist of Idea
For Fine, essences are propositions true because of identity, so they are just real definitions
Source
Kathrin Koslicki (Varieties of Ontological Dependence [2012], 7.4)
Book Ref
'Metaphysical Grounding', ed/tr. Correia,F/Schnieder,B [CUP 2012], p.196
A Reaction
This won't do, because the essence of a physical object is not a set of propositions, it is some aspects of the object itself, which are described in a definition. Koslicki notes that psuché is an essence, and the soul is hardly a set of propositions!
Related Idea
Idea 17315 We need a less propositional view of essence, and so must distinguish it clearly from real definitions [Koslicki]
17309 | For Fine, essences are propositions true because of identity, so they are just real definitions [Koslicki] |
17311 | Real definitions don't just single out a thing; they must also explain its essence [Koslicki] |
17312 | It is more explanatory if you show how a number is constructed from basic entities and relations [Koslicki] |
17313 | Modern views want essences just to individuate things across worlds and times [Koslicki] |
17314 | The relata of grounding are propositions or facts, but for dependence it is objects and their features [Koslicki] |
17315 | We need a less propositional view of essence, and so must distinguish it clearly from real definitions [Koslicki] |
17317 | A good explanation captures the real-world dependence among the phenomena [Koslicki] |
17316 | We can abstract to a dependent entity by blocking out features of its bearer [Koslicki] |