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Full Idea
A statement expressing a real definition must also accomplish more than simply to offer two different ways of singling out the same entity, since the definiens must also be explanatory of the essential nature of the definiendum.
Gist of Idea
Real definitions don't just single out a thing; they must also explain its essence
Source
Kathrin Koslicki (Varieties of Ontological Dependence [2012], 7.4)
Book Ref
'Metaphysical Grounding', ed/tr. Correia,F/Schnieder,B [CUP 2012], p.198
A Reaction
This is why Aristotelian definitions are not just short lexicographical definitions, but may be quite length. Effectively, a definition IS an explanation.
Related Idea
Idea 17313 Modern views want essences just to individuate things across worlds and times [Koslicki]
| 17309 | For Fine, essences are propositions true because of identity, so they are just real definitions [Koslicki] |
| 17311 | Real definitions don't just single out a thing; they must also explain its essence [Koslicki] |
| 17312 | It is more explanatory if you show how a number is constructed from basic entities and relations [Koslicki] |
| 17313 | Modern views want essences just to individuate things across worlds and times [Koslicki] |
| 17314 | The relata of grounding are propositions or facts, but for dependence it is objects and their features [Koslicki] |
| 17315 | We need a less propositional view of essence, and so must distinguish it clearly from real definitions [Koslicki] |
| 17317 | A good explanation captures the real-world dependence among the phenomena [Koslicki] |
| 17316 | We can abstract to a dependent entity by blocking out features of its bearer [Koslicki] |