more on this theme | more from this thinker
Full Idea
Many philosophers agree that true existential propositions have a truth-maker, but some go further, claiming that every true proposition has a truth-maker. More cautious theorists specify a class of truths, such as synthetic propositions.
Gist of Idea
Truthmakers for existence is fine; otherwise maybe restrict it to synthetic truths?
Source
David Liggins (Truth-makers and dependence [2012], 10.1)
Book Ref
'Metaphysical Grounding', ed/tr. Correia,F/Schnieder,B [CUP 2012], p.254
A Reaction
[compressed; Armstrong is the ambitious one, and Rodriguez-Pereyra proposes the synthetic propositions] Presumably synthetic propositions can make negative assertions, which are problematic for truth-makers.
| 17318 | Truthmakers for existence is fine; otherwise maybe restrict it to synthetic truths? [Liggins] |
| 17320 | Either p is true or not-p is true, so something is true, so something exists [Liggins] |
| 17322 | Necessities supervene on everything, but don't depend on everything [Liggins] |
| 17321 | Value, constitution and realisation are non-causal dependences that explain [Liggins] |
| 17323 | If explanations track dependence, then 'determinative' explanations seem to exist [Liggins] |
| 17324 | 'Because' can signal an inference rather than an explanation [Liggins] |
| 17326 | The dependence of {Socrates} on Socrates involves a set and a philosopher, not facts [Liggins] |
| 17325 | Truth-maker theory can't cope with non-causal dependence [Liggins] |
| 17327 | Non-causal dependence is at present only dimly understood [Liggins] |