more on this theme | more from this text
Full Idea
Either p or not-p. If p, then the proposition 'p' is true. If not p, then the proposition 'not p' is true. Either way, something is true. Thus something exists.
Gist of Idea
Either p is true or not-p is true, so something is true, so something exists
Source
David Liggins (Truth-makers and dependence [2012], 10.3 n5)
Book Ref
'Metaphysical Grounding', ed/tr. Correia,F/Schnieder,B [CUP 2012], p.260
A Reaction
Liggins offers this dodgy argument as an objection to conceptual truths having truth-makers.
| 14232 | We normally formalise 'There are Fs' with singular quantification and predication, but this may be wrong [Liggins] |
| 14231 | We should always apply someone's theory of meaning to their own utterances [Liggins] |
| 14233 | Nihilists needn't deny parts - they can just say that some of the xs are among the ys [Liggins] |
| 17318 | Truthmakers for existence is fine; otherwise maybe restrict it to synthetic truths? [Liggins] |
| 17320 | Either p is true or not-p is true, so something is true, so something exists [Liggins] |
| 17322 | Necessities supervene on everything, but don't depend on everything [Liggins] |
| 17321 | Value, constitution and realisation are non-causal dependences that explain [Liggins] |
| 17323 | If explanations track dependence, then 'determinative' explanations seem to exist [Liggins] |
| 17324 | 'Because' can signal an inference rather than an explanation [Liggins] |
| 17325 | Truth-maker theory can't cope with non-causal dependence [Liggins] |
| 17326 | The dependence of {Socrates} on Socrates involves a set and a philosopher, not facts [Liggins] |
| 17327 | Non-causal dependence is at present only dimly understood [Liggins] |