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Full Idea
Necessities supervene upon everything, but they do not depend on everything.
Gist of Idea
Necessities supervene on everything, but don't depend on everything
Source
David Liggins (Truth-makers and dependence [2012], 10.4)
Book Ref
'Metaphysical Grounding', ed/tr. Correia,F/Schnieder,B [CUP 2012], p.261
A Reaction
I'm not sure if merely existing together counts as sufficiently close to be 'supervenience'. If 2+2 necessitates 4, that hardly seems to 'supervene' on the Eiffel Tower. If so, how close must things be to qualify for supervenience?
| 17318 | Truthmakers for existence is fine; otherwise maybe restrict it to synthetic truths? [Liggins] |
| 17320 | Either p is true or not-p is true, so something is true, so something exists [Liggins] |
| 17322 | Necessities supervene on everything, but don't depend on everything [Liggins] |
| 17321 | Value, constitution and realisation are non-causal dependences that explain [Liggins] |
| 17323 | If explanations track dependence, then 'determinative' explanations seem to exist [Liggins] |
| 17324 | 'Because' can signal an inference rather than an explanation [Liggins] |
| 17326 | The dependence of {Socrates} on Socrates involves a set and a philosopher, not facts [Liggins] |
| 17325 | Truth-maker theory can't cope with non-causal dependence [Liggins] |
| 17327 | Non-causal dependence is at present only dimly understood [Liggins] |