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Full Idea
'Because' can signal an inference rather than an explanation.
Gist of Idea
'Because' can signal an inference rather than an explanation
Source
David Liggins (Truth-makers and dependence [2012], 10.5)
Book Ref
'Metaphysical Grounding', ed/tr. Correia,F/Schnieder,B [CUP 2012], p.263
A Reaction
Aristotle starts from words like 'why?', but it can be a deceptive approach to explanation.
17318 | Truthmakers for existence is fine; otherwise maybe restrict it to synthetic truths? [Liggins] |
17320 | Either p is true or not-p is true, so something is true, so something exists [Liggins] |
17322 | Necessities supervene on everything, but don't depend on everything [Liggins] |
17321 | Value, constitution and realisation are non-causal dependences that explain [Liggins] |
17323 | If explanations track dependence, then 'determinative' explanations seem to exist [Liggins] |
17324 | 'Because' can signal an inference rather than an explanation [Liggins] |
17326 | The dependence of {Socrates} on Socrates involves a set and a philosopher, not facts [Liggins] |
17325 | Truth-maker theory can't cope with non-causal dependence [Liggins] |
17327 | Non-causal dependence is at present only dimly understood [Liggins] |