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Single Idea 17368
[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
]
Full Idea
Essentialism is concerned with the nature of a group, whatever the category it falls under.
Gist of Idea
Essentialism concerns the nature of a group, not its category
Source
Michael Devitt (Resurrecting Biological Essentialism [2008], 6)
Book Ref
Devitt,Michael: 'Putting Metaphysics First' [OUP 2010], p.228
A Reaction
This seems to me such a simple and obvious point that I am amazed that anyone rejects it, yet lots of people seem to think that an essence is just some sort of category.
The
15 ideas
from Michael Devitt
17371
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Some kinds are very explanatory, but others less so, and some not at all
[Devitt]
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17372
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The higher categories are not natural kinds, so the Linnaean hierarchy should be given up
[Devitt]
|
17373
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Species pluralism says there are several good accounts of what a species is
[Devitt]
|
8501
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Quineans take predication about objects as basic, not reference to properties they may have
[Devitt]
|
8502
|
Realism doesn't explain 'a is F' any further by saying it is 'a has F-ness'
[Devitt]
|
8503
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The particular/universal distinction is unhelpful clutter; we should accept 'a is F' as basic
[Devitt]
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17369
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We name species as small to share properties, but large enough to yield generalisations
[Devitt]
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17370
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Things that gradually change, like species, can still have essences
[Devitt]
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17367
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Species are phenetic, biological, niche, or phylogenetic-cladistic
[Devitt, by PG]
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17368
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Essentialism concerns the nature of a group, not its category
[Devitt]
|
9354
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Why should necessities only be knowable a priori? That Hesperus is Phosporus is known empirically
[Devitt]
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9353
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We explain away a priori knowledge, not as directly empirical, but as indirectly holistically empirical
[Devitt]
|
9356
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The idea of the a priori is so obscure that it won't explain anything
[Devitt]
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19564
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Some knowledge must be empirical; naturalism implies that all knowledge is like that
[Devitt]
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19565
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How could the mind have a link to the necessary character of reality?
[Devitt]
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