more on this theme     |     more from this text

Single Idea 17368

[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species ]

Full Idea

Essentialism is concerned with the nature of a group, whatever the category it falls under.

Gist of Idea

Essentialism concerns the nature of a group, not its category

Source

Michael Devitt (Resurrecting Biological Essentialism [2008], 6)

Book Ref

Devitt,Michael: 'Putting Metaphysics First' [OUP 2010], p.228

A Reaction

This seems to me such a simple and obvious point that I am amazed that anyone rejects it, yet lots of people seem to think that an essence is just some sort of category.

The 15 ideas from Michael Devitt

17371 Some kinds are very explanatory, but others less so, and some not at all [Devitt]
17372 The higher categories are not natural kinds, so the Linnaean hierarchy should be given up [Devitt]
17373 Species pluralism says there are several good accounts of what a species is [Devitt]
8501 Quineans take predication about objects as basic, not reference to properties they may have [Devitt]
8502 Realism doesn't explain 'a is F' any further by saying it is 'a has F-ness' [Devitt]
8503 The particular/universal distinction is unhelpful clutter; we should accept 'a is F' as basic [Devitt]
17369 We name species as small to share properties, but large enough to yield generalisations [Devitt]
17370 Things that gradually change, like species, can still have essences [Devitt]
17367 Species are phenetic, biological, niche, or phylogenetic-cladistic [Devitt, by PG]
17368 Essentialism concerns the nature of a group, not its category [Devitt]
9354 Why should necessities only be knowable a priori? That Hesperus is Phosporus is known empirically [Devitt]
9353 We explain away a priori knowledge, not as directly empirical, but as indirectly holistically empirical [Devitt]
9356 The idea of the a priori is so obscure that it won't explain anything [Devitt]
19564 Some knowledge must be empirical; naturalism implies that all knowledge is like that [Devitt]
19565 How could the mind have a link to the necessary character of reality? [Devitt]