more on this theme
|
more from this text
Single Idea 17370
[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
]
Full Idea
An intrinsic essence does not have to be 'neat and tidy'. ...Essentialism can accept the gradual change of one thing into another.
Gist of Idea
Things that gradually change, like species, can still have essences
Source
Michael Devitt (Resurrecting Biological Essentialism [2008], 11)
Book Ref
Devitt,Michael: 'Putting Metaphysics First' [OUP 2010], p.248
A Reaction
My thesis is that essentialism is a response to the needs of explanation, so as long as there is some core explanation to be found, even in something transitory, then the concept of an essence can apply to it.
The
15 ideas
from Michael Devitt
17371
|
Some kinds are very explanatory, but others less so, and some not at all
[Devitt]
|
17372
|
The higher categories are not natural kinds, so the Linnaean hierarchy should be given up
[Devitt]
|
17373
|
Species pluralism says there are several good accounts of what a species is
[Devitt]
|
8501
|
Quineans take predication about objects as basic, not reference to properties they may have
[Devitt]
|
8502
|
Realism doesn't explain 'a is F' any further by saying it is 'a has F-ness'
[Devitt]
|
8503
|
The particular/universal distinction is unhelpful clutter; we should accept 'a is F' as basic
[Devitt]
|
17369
|
We name species as small to share properties, but large enough to yield generalisations
[Devitt]
|
17370
|
Things that gradually change, like species, can still have essences
[Devitt]
|
17367
|
Species are phenetic, biological, niche, or phylogenetic-cladistic
[Devitt, by PG]
|
17368
|
Essentialism concerns the nature of a group, not its category
[Devitt]
|
9354
|
Why should necessities only be knowable a priori? That Hesperus is Phosporus is known empirically
[Devitt]
|
9353
|
We explain away a priori knowledge, not as directly empirical, but as indirectly holistically empirical
[Devitt]
|
9356
|
The idea of the a priori is so obscure that it won't explain anything
[Devitt]
|
19564
|
Some knowledge must be empirical; naturalism implies that all knowledge is like that
[Devitt]
|
19565
|
How could the mind have a link to the necessary character of reality?
[Devitt]
|