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Single Idea 17370

[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species ]

Full Idea

An intrinsic essence does not have to be 'neat and tidy'. ...Essentialism can accept the gradual change of one thing into another.

Gist of Idea

Things that gradually change, like species, can still have essences

Source

Michael Devitt (Resurrecting Biological Essentialism [2008], 11)

Book Ref

Devitt,Michael: 'Putting Metaphysics First' [OUP 2010], p.248

A Reaction

My thesis is that essentialism is a response to the needs of explanation, so as long as there is some core explanation to be found, even in something transitory, then the concept of an essence can apply to it.

The 15 ideas from Michael Devitt

17371 Some kinds are very explanatory, but others less so, and some not at all [Devitt]
17372 The higher categories are not natural kinds, so the Linnaean hierarchy should be given up [Devitt]
17373 Species pluralism says there are several good accounts of what a species is [Devitt]
8501 Quineans take predication about objects as basic, not reference to properties they may have [Devitt]
8502 Realism doesn't explain 'a is F' any further by saying it is 'a has F-ness' [Devitt]
8503 The particular/universal distinction is unhelpful clutter; we should accept 'a is F' as basic [Devitt]
17369 We name species as small to share properties, but large enough to yield generalisations [Devitt]
17370 Things that gradually change, like species, can still have essences [Devitt]
17367 Species are phenetic, biological, niche, or phylogenetic-cladistic [Devitt, by PG]
17368 Essentialism concerns the nature of a group, not its category [Devitt]
9354 Why should necessities only be knowable a priori? That Hesperus is Phosporus is known empirically [Devitt]
9353 We explain away a priori knowledge, not as directly empirical, but as indirectly holistically empirical [Devitt]
9356 The idea of the a priori is so obscure that it won't explain anything [Devitt]
19564 Some knowledge must be empirical; naturalism implies that all knowledge is like that [Devitt]
19565 How could the mind have a link to the necessary character of reality? [Devitt]