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Single Idea 17375

[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 7. Critique of Kinds ]

Full Idea

The question of which natural kind a thing belongs to ....can be answered only in relation to some specification of the goal underlying the intent to classify the object.

Gist of Idea

Natural kinds are decided entirely by the intentions of our classification

Source

John Dupré (The Disorder of Things [1993], Intro)

Book Ref

Dupré,John: 'The Disorder of Things' [Harvard 1995], p.5


A Reaction

I don't think I believe this. The situation is complex, and our intents are relevant, but to find an intent which no longer classifies tigers into the same category is wilful silliness.


The 12 ideas with the same theme [objections to dividing nature into 'kinds']:

Natural kinds are not special; they are just well-defined resemblance collections [Abelard, by King,P]
If there are borderline cases between natural kinds, that makes them superficial [Ellis]
Generalised talk of 'natural kinds' is unfortunate, as they vary too much [Dummett]
Nominal essence may well be neither necessary nor sufficient for a natural kind [Kripke, by Bird]
Species do not have enough constancy to be natural kinds [Harré/Madden]
Natural kinds are decided entirely by the intentions of our classification [Dupré]
Wales may count as fish [Dupré]
Cooks, unlike scientists, distinguish garlic from onions [Dupré]
Borders between species are much less clear in vegetables than among animals [Dupré]
Even atoms of an element differ, in the energy levels of their electrons [Dupré]
Ecologists favour classifying by niche, even though that can clash with genealogy [Dupré]
Natural kinds are social institutions [Kusch]