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Single Idea 17375

[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 7. Critique of Kinds ]

Full Idea

The question of which natural kind a thing belongs to ....can be answered only in relation to some specification of the goal underlying the intent to classify the object.

Gist of Idea

Natural kinds are decided entirely by the intentions of our classification

Source

John Dupré (The Disorder of Things [1993], Intro)

Book Ref

Dupré,John: 'The Disorder of Things' [Harvard 1995], p.5


A Reaction

I don't think I believe this. The situation is complex, and our intents are relevant, but to find an intent which no longer classifies tigers into the same category is wilful silliness.


The 17 ideas from John Dupré

The possibility of prediction rests on determinism [Dupré]
Natural kinds are decided entirely by the intentions of our classification [Dupré]
Borders between species are much less clear in vegetables than among animals [Dupré]
All descriptive language is classificatory [Dupré]
Wales may count as fish [Dupré]
Presumably molecular structure seems important because we never have the Twin Earth experience [Dupré]
Cooks, unlike scientists, distinguish garlic from onions [Dupré]
Phylogenetics involves history, and cladism rests species on splits in lineage [Dupré]
Kinds don't do anything (including evolve) because they are abstract [Dupré]
A species might have its essential genetic mechanism replaced by a new one [Dupré]
It seems that species lack essential properties, so they can't be natural kinds [Dupré]
Even atoms of an element differ, in the energy levels of their electrons [Dupré]
Ecologists favour classifying by niche, even though that can clash with genealogy [Dupré]
Species are the lowest-level classification in biology [Dupré]
The theory of evolution is mainly about species [Dupré]
Natural kinds don't need essentialism to be explanatory [Dupré]
We should aim for a classification which tells us as much as possible about the object [Dupré]