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Single Idea 17378

[filed under theme 18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth ]

Full Idea

It is surely the absence of experiences like the one Putnam describes that makes it reasonable to attach to molecular structure at least most of the importance that Putnam ascribes to it.

Gist of Idea

Presumably molecular structure seems important because we never have the Twin Earth experience

Source

John Dupré (The Disorder of Things [1993], 1)

Book Ref

Dupré,John: 'The Disorder of Things' [Harvard 1995], p.26


A Reaction

That is, whenever we experience water-like stuff, it always turns out to have the same molecular structure. Twin Earth is a nice thought experiment, except that XZY is virtually inconceivable.


The 20 ideas with the same theme [we may not know what we mean by 'water']:

If Twins talking about 'water' and 'XYZ' have different thoughts but identical heads, then thoughts aren't in the head [Putnam, by Crane]
We say ice and steam are different forms of water, but not that they are different forms of H2O [Forbes,G on Putnam]
Does 'water' mean a particular substance that was 'dubbed'? [Putnam, by Rey]
'Water' on Twin Earth doesn't refer to water, but no mental difference can account for this [Putnam]
Reference may be different while mental representation is the same [Putnam]
Keep distinct the essential properties of water, and application conditions for the word 'water' [Jackson]
Two identical brain states could have different contents in different worlds [Kim]
Two types of water are irrelevant to accounts of behaviour [Kim]
What properties a thing must have to be a type of substance can be laid down a priori [Harré/Madden]
XYZ (Twin Earth 'water') is an impossibility [Fodor]
If concept content is reference, then my Twin and I are referring to the same stuff [Fodor]
Presumably molecular structure seems important because we never have the Twin Earth experience [Dupré]
The Twin Earth argument depends on reference being determined by content, which may be false. [Crane]
Twin Earth cases imply that even beliefs about kinds of stuff are indexical [Lowe]
If 'water' has narrow content, it refers to both H2O and XYZ [Segal]
Humans are made of H2O, so 'twins' aren't actually feasible [Segal]
Externalists can't assume old words refer to modern natural kinds [Segal]
That water is essentially H2O in some way concerns how we use 'water' [Sidelle]
Your view of water depends on whether you start from the actual Earth or its counterfactual Twin [Schroeter]
Water must be related to water, just as tigers must be related to tigers [Almog]