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Single Idea 17388

[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species ]

Full Idea

It is widely agreed among biologists that no essential property can be found to demarcate species, so that if an essential property is necessary for a natural kind, species are not natural kinds.

Gist of Idea

It seems that species lack essential properties, so they can't be natural kinds

Source

John Dupré (The Disorder of Things [1993], 2)

Book Ref

Dupré,John: 'The Disorder of Things' [Harvard 1995], p.53

A Reaction

This uses 'essential' to mean 'necessary', but I would use 'essential' to mean 'deeply explanatory'. Biological species are, nevertheless, dubious members of an ontological system. Vegetables are the problem.

Related Idea

Idea 17379 Borders between species are much less clear in vegetables than among animals [Dupré]

The 18 ideas with the same theme [essence for animals is the species they belong to]:

16106 Generalities like man and horse are not substances, but universal composites of account and matter [Aristotle]
16144 Genera are not substances, and do not exist apart from the ingredient species [Aristotle]
12359 'Categories' answers 'what?' with species, genus, differerentia; 'Met.' Z.17 seeks causal essence [Aristotle, by Wedin]
12068 Standardly, Aristotelian essences are taken to be universals of the species [Aristotle, by Witt]
16141 In 'Met.' he says genera can't be substances or qualities, so aren't in the ontology [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
16149 Generic terms like 'man' are not substances, but qualities, relations, modes or some such thing [Aristotle]
13434 In our ideas, the idea of essence is inseparable from the concept of a species [Locke]
16035 If we based species on real essences, the individuals would be as indistinguishable as two circles [Locke]
16036 Internal constitution doesn't decide a species; should a watch contain four wheels or five? [Locke]
12987 For some sorts, a member of it is necessarily a member [Leibniz]
12906 Truths about species are eternal or necessary, but individual truths concern what exists [Leibniz]
16955 Kripke says internal structure fixes species; I say it is genetic affinity and a common descent [Kripke, by Dummett]
16996 Given that Nixon is indeed a human being, that he might not have been does not concern knowledge [Kripke]
17370 Things that gradually change, like species, can still have essences [Devitt]
17368 Essentialism concerns the nature of a group, not its category [Devitt]
17388 It seems that species lack essential properties, so they can't be natural kinds [Dupré]
17389 A species might have its essential genetic mechanism replaced by a new one [Dupré]
17870 Alien 'tigers' can't be tigers if they are not related to our tigers [Almog]