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Single Idea 17388
[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
]
Full Idea
It is widely agreed among biologists that no essential property can be found to demarcate species, so that if an essential property is necessary for a natural kind, species are not natural kinds.
Gist of Idea
It seems that species lack essential properties, so they can't be natural kinds
Source
John Dupré (The Disorder of Things [1993], 2)
Book Ref
Dupré,John: 'The Disorder of Things' [Harvard 1995], p.53
A Reaction
This uses 'essential' to mean 'necessary', but I would use 'essential' to mean 'deeply explanatory'. Biological species are, nevertheless, dubious members of an ontological system. Vegetables are the problem.
Related Idea
Idea 17379
Borders between species are much less clear in vegetables than among animals [Dupré]
The
18 ideas
with the same theme
[essence for animals is the species they belong to]:
16106
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Generalities like man and horse are not substances, but universal composites of account and matter
[Aristotle]
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16144
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Genera are not substances, and do not exist apart from the ingredient species
[Aristotle]
|
12359
|
'Categories' answers 'what?' with species, genus, differerentia; 'Met.' Z.17 seeks causal essence
[Aristotle, by Wedin]
|
12068
|
Standardly, Aristotelian essences are taken to be universals of the species
[Aristotle, by Witt]
|
16141
|
In 'Met.' he says genera can't be substances or qualities, so aren't in the ontology
[Aristotle, by Frede,M]
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16149
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Generic terms like 'man' are not substances, but qualities, relations, modes or some such thing
[Aristotle]
|
13434
|
In our ideas, the idea of essence is inseparable from the concept of a species
[Locke]
|
16035
|
If we based species on real essences, the individuals would be as indistinguishable as two circles
[Locke]
|
16036
|
Internal constitution doesn't decide a species; should a watch contain four wheels or five?
[Locke]
|
12987
|
For some sorts, a member of it is necessarily a member
[Leibniz]
|
12906
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Truths about species are eternal or necessary, but individual truths concern what exists
[Leibniz]
|
16955
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Kripke says internal structure fixes species; I say it is genetic affinity and a common descent
[Kripke, by Dummett]
|
16996
|
Given that Nixon is indeed a human being, that he might not have been does not concern knowledge
[Kripke]
|
17370
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Things that gradually change, like species, can still have essences
[Devitt]
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17368
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Essentialism concerns the nature of a group, not its category
[Devitt]
|
17388
|
It seems that species lack essential properties, so they can't be natural kinds
[Dupré]
|
17389
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A species might have its essential genetic mechanism replaced by a new one
[Dupré]
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17870
|
Alien 'tigers' can't be tigers if they are not related to our tigers
[Almog]
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