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Single Idea 17405

[filed under theme 14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction ]

Full Idea

A theorist may have designed his theory to fit the facts, but is it not equally possible for observers to be influenced by a theory in their report of experimental facts?

Gist of Idea

If a theory can be fudged, so can observations

Source

Eric R. Scerri (The Periodic Table [2007], 05 'Power')

Book Ref

Scerri,Eric R.: 'The Periodic Table' [OUP 2007], p.150


A Reaction

This is in reply to Lipton's claim that prediction is better than accommodation because of the 'fudging' problem. The reply is that you might fudge to achieve a prediction. If it was correct, that wouldn't avoid the charge of fudging.

Related Idea

Idea 16857 Predictions are best for finding explanations, because mere accommodations can be fudged [Lipton]


The 18 ideas with the same theme [predicting events as support for a theory]:

Successful prediction shows proficiency in nature [Leibniz]
Explanatory facts also predict, and predictive facts also explain [Hempel, by Okasha]
Correlations can provide predictions, but only causes can give explanations [Salmon]
Most predictions are uninteresting, and are only sought in order to confirm a theory [Putnam]
Unpredictability doesn't entail inexplicability, and predictability doesn't entail explicability [MacIntyre]
The 'symmetry thesis' says explanation and prediction only differ pragmatically [Ruben]
It is more impressive that relativity predicted Mercury's orbit than if it had accommodated it [Lipton]
Predictions are best for finding explanations, because mere accommodations can be fudged [Lipton]
Explanation does not entail prediction [Flanagan]
The possibility of prediction rests on determinism [Dupré]
A good barometer will predict a storm, but not explain it [Psillos]
If we say where Mars was two months ago, we offer an explanation without a prediction [Psillos]
Explanation predicts after the event; prediction explains before the event [Bird]
Predictions give the 'content' of theories, which can then be 'equivalent' or 'adequate' [Button]
What matters is whether a theory can predict - not whether it actually does so [Ladyman/Ross]
The theory of evolution was accepted because it explained, not because of its predictions [Ladyman/Ross]
If a theory can be fudged, so can observations [Scerri]
A system can infer the structure of the world by making predictions about it [New Sci.]