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Single Idea 17509
[filed under theme 9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
]
Full Idea
Some hold that the 'covering concept' completes the incomplete concept of identity, determining the kind of sameness involved. Others strongly deny the identity itself is incomplete, and locate the covering concept within the necessary act of reference.
Gist of Idea
Some say a 'covering concept' completes identity; others place the concept in the reference
Source
M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], Intro)
Book Ref
-: 'Canadian Journal of Philosophy' [-], p.113
A Reaction
[a bit compressed; Geach is the first view, and Quine the second; Wiggins is somewhere between the two]
The
33 ideas
with the same theme
[how we should understand the idea of identity]:
11380
|
Two things with the same primary being and essence are one thing
[Aristotle]
|
22143
|
Identity does not exclude possible or imagined difference
[Suárez, by Boulter]
|
22144
|
Real Essential distinction: A and B are of different natural kinds
[Suárez, by Boulter]
|
22146
|
Minor Real distinction: B needs A, but A doesn't need B
[Suárez, by Boulter]
|
22145
|
Major Real distinction: A and B have independent existences
[Suárez, by Boulter]
|
22147
|
Conceptual/Mental distinction: one thing can be conceived of in two different ways
[Suárez, by Boulter]
|
22148
|
Modal distinction: A isn't B or its property, but still needs B
[Suárez, by Boulter]
|
19394
|
Inequality can be brought infinitely close to equality
[Leibniz]
|
1207
|
Both number and unity are incompatible with the relation of identity
[Hume]
|
21290
|
Multiple objects cannot convey identity, because we see them as different
[Hume]
|
11874
|
Real identity admits of no degrees
[Reid]
|
21320
|
Identity is familiar to common sense, but very hard to define
[Reid]
|
1367
|
Identity can only be affirmed of things which have a continued existence
[Reid]
|
16022
|
The idea of a criterion of identity was introduced by Frege
[Frege, by Noonan]
|
11100
|
Frege's algorithm of identity is the law of putting equals for equals
[Frege, by Quine]
|
4893
|
Frege was asking how identities could be informative
[Frege, by Perry]
|
6056
|
Identity is not a relation between objects
[Wittgenstein]
|
17595
|
To unite a sequence of ostensions to make one object, a prior concept of identity is needed
[Quine]
|
18965
|
We know what things are by distinguishing them, so identity is part of ontology
[Quine]
|
15475
|
The concept of 'identity' must allow for some changes in properties or parts
[Martin,CB]
|
15486
|
Only abstract things can have specific and full identity specifications
[Martin,CB]
|
18389
|
When entities contain entities, or overlap with them, there is 'partial' identity
[Armstrong]
|
16981
|
With the necessity of self-identity plus Leibniz's Law, identity has to be an 'internal' relation
[Kripke]
|
17509
|
Some say a 'covering concept' completes identity; others place the concept in the reference
[Ayers]
|
4885
|
Identity is a very weak relation, which doesn't require interdefinability, or shared properties
[Perry]
|
11843
|
Identity over a time and at a time aren't different concepts
[Wiggins]
|
11864
|
Hesperus=Hesperus, and Phosphorus=Hesperus, so necessarily Phosphorus=Hesperus
[Wiggins]
|
17588
|
We should talk of the transitivity of 'identity', and of 'definite identity'
[Inwagen]
|
6058
|
Identity propositions are not always tautological, and have a key epistemic role
[McGinn]
|
11888
|
Identities must hold because of other facts, which must be instrinsic
[Forbes,G, by Mackie,P]
|
15603
|
I can only represent individuals as the same if I do not already represent them as the same
[Fine,K]
|
10522
|
The relations featured in criteria of identity are always equivalence relations
[Hale]
|
8970
|
Our notion of identical sets involves identical members, which needs absolute identity
[Hawthorne]
|