more on this theme
|
more from this text
Single Idea 17510
[filed under theme 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
]
Full Idea
If a speaker indicates something, then in order for others to catch his reference they must know, at some level of generality, what kind of thing is indicated. They must categorise it as event, object, or quality. Thinking about something needs that much.
Gist of Idea
Speakers need the very general category of a thing, if they are to think about it
Source
M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], Intro)
Book Ref
-: 'Canadian Journal of Philosophy' [-], p.114
A Reaction
Ayers defends the view that such general categories are required, but not the much narrower sortal terms defended by Geach and Wiggins. I'm with Ayers all the way. 'What the hell is that?'
The
15 ideas
from M.R. Ayers
17511
|
Recognising continuity is separate from sortals, and must precede their use
[Ayers]
|
17510
|
Speakers need the very general category of a thing, if they are to think about it
[Ayers]
|
17509
|
Some say a 'covering concept' completes identity; others place the concept in the reference
[Ayers]
|
17521
|
You can't have the concept of a 'stage' if you lack the concept of an object
[Ayers]
|
17522
|
We use sortals to classify physical objects by the nature and origin of their unity
[Ayers]
|
17523
|
Sortals basically apply to individuals
[Ayers]
|
17520
|
Events do not have natural boundaries, and we have to set them
[Ayers]
|
17519
|
To express borderline cases of objects, you need the concept of an 'object'
[Ayers]
|
17518
|
Counting 'coin in this box' may have coin as the unit, with 'in this box' merely as the scope
[Ayers]
|
17514
|
Temporal 'parts' cannot be separated or rearranged
[Ayers]
|
17512
|
If diachronic identities need covering concepts, why not synchronic identities too?
[Ayers]
|
17513
|
If there are two objects, then 'that marble, man-shaped object' is ambiguous
[Ayers]
|
17515
|
Seeing caterpillar and moth as the same needs continuity, not identity of sortal concepts
[Ayers]
|
17517
|
Could the same matter have more than one form or principle of unity?
[Ayers]
|
17516
|
If counting needs a sortal, what of things which fall under two sortals?
[Ayers]
|