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Full Idea
The abstract question arises of whether the same matter could be subject to more than one principle of unity simultaneously, or unified by more than one 'form'.
Gist of Idea
Could the same matter have more than one form or principle of unity?
Source
M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Realist' vii)
Book Ref
-: 'Canadian Journal of Philosophy' [-], p.132
A Reaction
He suggests that the unity of the sweater is destroyed by unravelling, and the unity of the thread by cutting.
Related Idea
Idea 17516 If counting needs a sortal, what of things which fall under two sortals? [Ayers]
17511 | Recognising continuity is separate from sortals, and must precede their use [Ayers] |
17510 | Speakers need the very general category of a thing, if they are to think about it [Ayers] |
17509 | Some say a 'covering concept' completes identity; others place the concept in the reference [Ayers] |
17521 | You can't have the concept of a 'stage' if you lack the concept of an object [Ayers] |
17522 | We use sortals to classify physical objects by the nature and origin of their unity [Ayers] |
17523 | Sortals basically apply to individuals [Ayers] |
17520 | Events do not have natural boundaries, and we have to set them [Ayers] |
17519 | To express borderline cases of objects, you need the concept of an 'object' [Ayers] |
17518 | Counting 'coin in this box' may have coin as the unit, with 'in this box' merely as the scope [Ayers] |
17514 | Temporal 'parts' cannot be separated or rearranged [Ayers] |
17512 | If diachronic identities need covering concepts, why not synchronic identities too? [Ayers] |
17513 | If there are two objects, then 'that marble, man-shaped object' is ambiguous [Ayers] |
17515 | Seeing caterpillar and moth as the same needs continuity, not identity of sortal concepts [Ayers] |
17517 | Could the same matter have more than one form or principle of unity? [Ayers] |
17516 | If counting needs a sortal, what of things which fall under two sortals? [Ayers] |