more from this thinker | more from this text
Full Idea
If we count the concept 'coin in this box', we could regard coin as the 'unit', while taking 'in this box' to limit the scope. Counting coins in two boxes would be not a difference in unit (kind of object), but in scope.
Gist of Idea
Counting 'coin in this box' may have coin as the unit, with 'in this box' merely as the scope
Source
M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Counting')
Book Ref
-: 'Canadian Journal of Philosophy' [-], p.139
A Reaction
This is a very nice alternative to the Fregean view of counting, depending totally on the concept, and rests more on a natural concept of object. I prefer Ayers. Compare 'count coins till I tell you to stop'.
17438 | Our concepts decide what is countable, as in seeing the leaves of the tree, or the foliage [Frege, by Koslicki] |
17427 | Frege's 'isolation' could be absence of overlap, or drawing conceptual boundaries [Frege, by Koslicki] |
17437 | Non-arbitrary division means that what falls under the concept cannot be divided into more of the same [Frege, by Koslicki] |
17426 | A concept creating a unit must isolate and unify what falls under it [Frege] |
17428 | Frege says counting is determining what number belongs to a given concept [Frege, by Koslicki] |
12154 | Are 'word token' and 'word type' different sorts of countable objects, or two ways of counting? [Geach, by Perry] |
17518 | Counting 'coin in this box' may have coin as the unit, with 'in this box' merely as the scope [Ayers] |
17516 | If counting needs a sortal, what of things which fall under two sortals? [Ayers] |
17529 | Maybe the concept needed under which things coincide must also yield a principle of counting [Wiggins] |
17530 | The sortal needed for identities may not always be sufficient to support counting [Wiggins] |
13867 | Instances of a non-sortal concept can only be counted relative to a sortal concept [Wright,C] |
17434 | We struggle to count branches and waves because our concepts lack clear boundaries [Koslicki] |