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Single Idea 17521
[filed under theme 9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
]
Full Idea
It would be impossible for anyone to have the concept of a stage who did not already possess the concept of a physical object.
Gist of Idea
You can't have the concept of a 'stage' if you lack the concept of an object
Source
M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Concl')
Book Ref
-: 'Canadian Journal of Philosophy' [-], p.144
The
21 ideas
with the same theme
[things have parts in time, as they do in space]:
13267
|
Temporal parts is a crazy doctrine, because it entails constantly creating stuff ex nihilo
[Thomson, by Koslicki]
|
16209
|
How can point-duration slices of people have beliefs or desires?
[Thomson]
|
17521
|
You can't have the concept of a 'stage' if you lack the concept of an object
[Ayers]
|
17514
|
Temporal 'parts' cannot be separated or rearranged
[Ayers]
|
16023
|
Stage theorists accept four-dimensionalism, but call each stage a whole object
[Noonan]
|
12297
|
Three-dimensionalist can accept temporal parts, as things enduring only for an instant
[Fine,K]
|
17279
|
Even a three-dimensionalist might identify temporal parts, in their thinking
[Fine,K]
|
14730
|
Temporal parts exist, but are not prior building blocks for objects
[Sider]
|
14731
|
Temporal parts are instantaneous
[Sider]
|
14758
|
How can an instantaneous stage believe anything, if beliefs take time?
[Sider]
|
14762
|
Four-dimensionalism says temporal parts are caused (through laws of motion) by previous temporal parts
[Sider]
|
16203
|
Stage Theory seems to miss out the link between stages of the same object
[Hawley]
|
16204
|
Stage Theory says every stage is a distinct object, which gives too many objects
[Hawley]
|
16205
|
The stages of Stage Theory seem too thin to populate the world, or to be referred to
[Hawley]
|
16206
|
Stages must be as fine-grained in length as change itself, so any change is a new stage
[Hawley]
|
16212
|
An isolated stage can't be a banana (which involves suitable relations to other stages)
[Hawley]
|
16213
|
Stages of one thing are related by extrinsic counterfactual and causal relations
[Hawley]
|
13927
|
We must explain change amongst 'momentary entities', or else the world is inexplicable
[Haslanger]
|
13928
|
If the things which exist prior to now are totally distinct, they need not have existed
[Haslanger]
|
14410
|
You believe you existed last year, but your segment doesn't, so they have different beliefs
[Merricks]
|
14561
|
Perdurantism imposes no order on temporal parts, so sequences of events are contingent
[Mumford/Anjum]
|