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Single Idea 17521
[filed under theme 9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
]
Full Idea
It would be impossible for anyone to have the concept of a stage who did not already possess the concept of a physical object.
Gist of Idea
You can't have the concept of a 'stage' if you lack the concept of an object
Source
M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Concl')
Book Ref
-: 'Canadian Journal of Philosophy' [-], p.144
The
15 ideas
from 'Individuals without Sortals'
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17511
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Recognising continuity is separate from sortals, and must precede their use
[Ayers]
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17510
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Speakers need the very general category of a thing, if they are to think about it
[Ayers]
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17509
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Some say a 'covering concept' completes identity; others place the concept in the reference
[Ayers]
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17521
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You can't have the concept of a 'stage' if you lack the concept of an object
[Ayers]
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17522
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We use sortals to classify physical objects by the nature and origin of their unity
[Ayers]
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17523
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Sortals basically apply to individuals
[Ayers]
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17520
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Events do not have natural boundaries, and we have to set them
[Ayers]
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17519
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To express borderline cases of objects, you need the concept of an 'object'
[Ayers]
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17518
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Counting 'coin in this box' may have coin as the unit, with 'in this box' merely as the scope
[Ayers]
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17514
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Temporal 'parts' cannot be separated or rearranged
[Ayers]
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17512
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If diachronic identities need covering concepts, why not synchronic identities too?
[Ayers]
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17513
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If there are two objects, then 'that marble, man-shaped object' is ambiguous
[Ayers]
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17515
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Seeing caterpillar and moth as the same needs continuity, not identity of sortal concepts
[Ayers]
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17517
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Could the same matter have more than one form or principle of unity?
[Ayers]
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17516
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If counting needs a sortal, what of things which fall under two sortals?
[Ayers]
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