more on this theme | more from this thinker
Full Idea
Lewis's basic account has a basic causal relation, counterfactual dependence, and the general causal relation is the ancestral of this basic one. ...This is motivated by counterfactual dependence failing to be general because of the pre-emption problem.
Gist of Idea
Lewis has basic causation, counterfactuals, and a general ancestral (thus handling pre-emption)
Source
report of David Lewis (Causation [1973]) by Alexander Bird - Causation and the Manifestation of Powers p.161
Book Ref
'The Metaphysics of Powers', ed/tr. Marmodoro,Anna [OUP 2013], p.161
A Reaction
It is so nice when you struggle for ages with a topic, and then some clever person summarises it clearly for you.
Related Idea
Idea 10032 'Ancestral' relations are derived by iterating back from a given relation [Frege, by George/Velleman]
| 9476 | If dispositions are more fundamental than causes, then they won't conceptually reduce to them [Bird on Lewis] |
| 8405 | A theory of causation should explain why cause precedes effect, not take it for granted [Lewis, by Field,H] |
| 10392 | It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause [Lewis] |
| 17525 | The counterfactual view says causes are necessary (rather than sufficient) for their effects [Lewis, by Bird] |
| 17524 | Lewis has basic causation, counterfactuals, and a general ancestral (thus handling pre-emption) [Lewis, by Bird] |
| 8397 | Counterfactual causation implies all laws are causal, which they aren't [Tooley on Lewis] |
| 4795 | Lewis's account of counterfactuals is fine if we know what a law of nature is, but it won't explain the latter [Cohen,LJ on Lewis] |
| 8419 | The modern regularity view says a cause is a member of a minimal set of sufficient conditions [Lewis] |
| 8420 | A proposition is a set of possible worlds where it is true [Lewis] |
| 8421 | Regularity analyses could make c an effect of e, or an epiphenomenon, or inefficacious, or pre-empted [Lewis] |
| 8423 | My counterfactual analysis applies to particular cases, not generalisations [Lewis] |
| 8424 | Determinism says there can't be two identical worlds up to a time, with identical laws, which then differ [Lewis] |
| 8425 | For true counterfactuals, both antecedent and consequent true is closest to actuality [Lewis] |
| 8426 | One event causes another iff there is a causal chain from first to second [Lewis] |
| 8427 | I reject making the direction of causation axiomatic, since that takes too much for granted [Lewis] |