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Single Idea 17528

[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause ]

Full Idea

The analysis of causation in terms of dispositions provides no conceptual reduction, but it does provide insight into the metaphysics of causation. We then know what causation is - it is the stimulation and manifestation of a disposition.

Gist of Idea

The dispositional account explains causation, as stimulation and manifestation of dispositions

Source

Alexander Bird (Causation and the Manifestation of Powers [2010], p.167)

Book Ref

'The Metaphysics of Powers', ed/tr. Marmodoro,Anna [OUP 2013], p.167

A Reaction

I would say that it offers the essence of causation, by giving a basic explanation of it. See Mumford/Lill Anjum on this.

The 98 ideas from Alexander Bird

17526 The counterfactual approach makes no distinction between cause and pre-condition [Bird]
17528 The dispositional account explains causation, as stimulation and manifestation of dispositions [Bird]
17527 Causation seems to be an innate concept (or acquired very early) [Bird]
14540 Only real powers are fundamental [Bird, by Mumford/Anjum]
23713 Most laws supervene on fundamental laws, which are explained by basic powers [Bird, by Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
9450 If all properties are potencies, and stimuli and manifestation characterise them, there is a regress [Bird]
9449 The plausible Barcan formula implies modality in the actual world [Bird]
9507 Laws are explanatory relationships of things, which supervene on their essences [Bird]
9473 Laws cannot offer unified explanations if they don't involve universals [Bird]
9472 Resemblance itself needs explanation, presumably in terms of something held in common [Bird]
9474 A disposition is finkish if a time delay might mean the manifestation fizzles out [Bird]
9475 A robust pot attached to a sensitive bomb is not fragile, but if struck it will easily break [Bird]
9477 Categorical properties are not modally fixed, but change across possible worlds [Bird]
9482 If the laws necessarily imply p, that doesn't give a new 'nomological' necessity [Bird]
9481 Logical necessitation is not a kind of necessity; George Orwell not being Eric Blair is not a real possibility [Bird]
9479 Dispositional essentialism says laws (and laws about laws) are guaranteed regularities [Bird]
9484 If the universals for laws must be instantiated, a vanishing particular could destroy a law [Bird]
9486 Why should a universal's existence depend on instantiation in an existing particular? [Bird]
9487 We can't reject all explanations because of a regress; inexplicable A can still explain B [Bird]
9488 Laws are either disposition regularities, or relations between properties [Bird]
9489 Essentialism can't use conditionals to explain regularities, because of possible interventions [Bird]
9490 The categoricalist idea is that a property is only individuated by being itself [Bird]
9491 Haecceitism says identity is independent of qualities and without essence [Bird]
9493 We should explain causation by powers, not powers by causation [Bird]
9494 Singularism about causes is wrong, as the universals involved imply laws [Bird]
9495 If we abstractly define a property, that doesn't mean some object could possess it [Bird]
9496 That other diamonds are hard does not explain why this one is [Bird]
9492 Categoricalists take properties to be quiddities, with no essential difference between them [Bird]
9498 The essence of a potency involves relations, e.g. mass, to impressed force and acceleration [Bird]
9499 Megarian actualists deny unmanifested dispositions [Bird]
9501 If all existents are causally active, that excludes abstracta and causally isolated objects [Bird]
9500 If naturalism refers to supervenience, that leaves necessary entities untouched [Bird]
9502 There might be just one fundamental natural property [Bird]
9503 To name an abundant property is either a Fregean concept, or a simple predicate [Bird]
9504 The relational view of space-time doesn't cover times and places where things could be [Bird]
9505 Empiricist saw imaginability and possibility as close, but now they seem remote [Bird]
9506 Salt necessarily dissolves in water, because of the law which makes the existence of salt possible [Bird]
6807 In Newton mass is conserved, but in Einstein it can convert into energy [Bird]
6805 Relativity ousted Newtonian mechanics despite a loss of simplicity [Bird]
6738 Any conclusion can be drawn from an induction, if we use grue-like predicates [Bird]
6739 Several months of observing beech trees supports the deciduous and evergreen hypotheses [Bird]
6745 A regularity is only a law if it is part of a complete system which is simple and strong [Bird]
6746 There may be many laws, each with only a few instances [Bird]
6740 'All uranium lumps are small' is a law, but 'all gold lumps are small' is not [Bird]
6741 There can be remarkable uniformities in nature that are purely coincidental [Bird]
6742 A law might have no instances, if it was about things that only exist momentarily [Bird]
6743 If laws are just instances, the law should either have gaps, or join the instances arbitrarily [Bird]
6744 Where is the regularity in a law predicting nuclear decay? [Bird]
6747 Laws cannot explain instances if they are regularities, as something can't explain itself [Bird]
6748 Similar appearance of siblings is a regularity, but shared parents is what links them [Bird]
6749 We can only infer a true regularity if something binds the instances together [Bird]
6754 We talk both of 'people' explaining things, and of 'facts' explaining things [Bird]
6761 Contrastive explanations say why one thing happened but not another [Bird]
6757 Explanation predicts after the event; prediction explains before the event [Bird]
6752 The objective component of explanations is the things that must exist for the explanation [Bird]
6753 Laws are more fundamental in science than causes, and laws will explain causes [Bird]
6762 Newton's laws cannot be confirmed individually, but only in combinations [Bird]
6763 Parapsychology is mere speculation, because it offers no mechanisms for its working [Bird]
6750 Explanations are causal, nomic, psychological, psychoanalytic, Darwinian or functional [Bird]
6758 'Covering law' explanations only work if no other explanations are to be found [Bird]
6759 Livers always accompany hearts, but they don't explain hearts [Bird]
6756 Probabilistic-statistical explanations don't entail the explanandum, but makes it more likely [Bird]
6760 An operation might reduce the probability of death, yet explain a death [Bird]
6751 Maybe explanation is so subjective that it cannot be a part of science [Bird]
6773 If F is a universal appearing in a natural law, then Fs form a natural kind [Bird]
6772 Existence requires laws, as inertia or gravity are needed for mass or matter [Bird]
6769 In the Kripke-Putnam view only nuclear physicists can know natural kinds [Bird]
6774 Darwinism suggests that we should have a native ability to detect natural kinds [Bird]
6776 Natural kinds are those that we use in induction [Bird]
6767 Rubies and sapphires are both corundum, with traces of metals varying their colours [Bird]
6768 Tin is not one natural kind, but appears to be 21, depending on isotope [Bird]
6771 Natural kinds may overlap, or be sub-kinds of one another [Bird]
6770 Membership of a purely random collection cannot be used as an explanation [Bird]
6764 Nominal essence of a natural kind is the features that make it fit its name [Bird]
6766 Jadeite and nephrite are superficially identical, but have different composition [Bird]
6775 Induction is inference to the best explanation, where the explanation is a law [Bird]
6786 As science investigates more phenomena, the theories it needs decreases [Bird]
6779 Instrumentalists say distinctions between observation and theory vanish with ostensive definition [Bird]
6780 Anti-realism is more plausible about laws than about entities and theories [Bird]
6777 Realists say their theories involve truth and the existence of their phenomena [Bird]
6778 Instrumentalists regard theories as tools for prediction, with truth being irrelevant [Bird]
6785 Inference to the Best Explanation is done with facts, so it has to be realist [Bird]
6788 Maybe bad explanations are the true ones, in this messy world [Bird]
6787 Which explanation is 'best' is bound to be subjective, and no guide to truth [Bird]
6791 If Hume is right about induction, there is no scientific knowledge [Bird]
6790 Anything justifying inferences from observed to unobserved must itself do that [Bird]
6792 If theories need observation, and observations need theories, how do we start? [Bird]
6789 If flame colour is characteristic of a metal, that is an empirical claim needing justification [Bird]
6796 Subjective probability measures personal beliefs; objective probability measures the chance of an event happening [Bird]
6797 Objective probability of tails measures the bias of the coin, not our beliefs about it [Bird]
6798 Bayesianism claims to find rationality and truth in induction, and show how science works [Bird]
6800 Many philosophers rate justification as a more important concept than knowledge [Bird]
6799 We normally learn natural kinds from laws, but Goodman shows laws require prior natural kinds [Bird]
6804 There is no agreement on scientific method - because there is no such thing [Bird]
6808 Reference to scientific terms is by explanatory role, not by descriptions [Bird]
6802 With strange enough predicates, anything could be made out to be a regularity [Bird]
6803 If we only infer laws from regularities among observations, we can't infer unobservable entities. [Bird]
6801 Accidental regularities are not laws, and an apparent regularity may not be actual [Bird]