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Single Idea 17529
[filed under theme 6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / d. Counting via concepts
]
Full Idea
My thesis C says that to specify something or other under which a and b coincide is to specify a concept f which qualifies for this purpose only if it yields a principle of counting for fs. ...I submit that C is false, though a near miss.
Gist of Idea
Maybe the concept needed under which things coincide must also yield a principle of counting
Source
David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance [1980], 1.1)
Book Ref
Wiggins,David: 'Sameness and Substance' [Blackwell 1980], p.18
The
12 ideas
with the same theme
[grouping by concept for counting]:
17437
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Non-arbitrary division means that what falls under the concept cannot be divided into more of the same
[Frege, by Koslicki]
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17438
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Our concepts decide what is countable, as in seeing the leaves of the tree, or the foliage
[Frege, by Koslicki]
|
17427
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Frege's 'isolation' could be absence of overlap, or drawing conceptual boundaries
[Frege, by Koslicki]
|
17426
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A concept creating a unit must isolate and unify what falls under it
[Frege]
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17428
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Frege says counting is determining what number belongs to a given concept
[Frege, by Koslicki]
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12154
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Are 'word token' and 'word type' different sorts of countable objects, or two ways of counting?
[Geach, by Perry]
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17518
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Counting 'coin in this box' may have coin as the unit, with 'in this box' merely as the scope
[Ayers]
|
17516
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If counting needs a sortal, what of things which fall under two sortals?
[Ayers]
|
17529
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Maybe the concept needed under which things coincide must also yield a principle of counting
[Wiggins]
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17530
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The sortal needed for identities may not always be sufficient to support counting
[Wiggins]
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13867
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Instances of a non-sortal concept can only be counted relative to a sortal concept
[Wright,C]
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17434
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We struggle to count branches and waves because our concepts lack clear boundaries
[Koslicki]
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