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Single Idea 17554

[filed under theme 9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects ]

Full Idea

There are never two beings in nature that are perfectly alike, two beings in which it is not possible to discover an internal difference, that is, one founded on an intrinsic denomination.

Gist of Idea

There must be some internal difference between any two beings in nature

Source

Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716], §09)

Book Ref

Leibniz,Gottfried: 'Philosophical Essays', ed/tr. Arlew,R /Garber,D [Hackett 1989], p.214


A Reaction

From this it follows that if two things really are indiscernible, then we must say that they are one thing. He says monads all differ from one another. People certainly do. Leibniz must say this of electrons. How can he know this?


The 19 ideas from 'Monadology'

The monad idea incomprehensibly spiritualises matter, instead of materialising soul [La Mettrie on Leibniz]
He replaced Aristotelian continuants with monads [Leibniz, by Wiggins]
Is a drop of urine really an infinity of thinking monads? [Voltaire on Leibniz]
It is unclear in 'Monadology' how extended bodies relate to mind-like monads. [Garber on Leibniz]
If a substance is just a thing that has properties, it seems to be a characterless non-entity [Leibniz, by Macdonald,C]
The true elements are atomic monads [Leibniz]
There must be some internal difference between any two beings in nature [Leibniz]
Changes in a monad come from an internal principle, and the diversity within its substance [Leibniz]
Increase a conscious machine to the size of a mill - you still won't see perceptions in it [Leibniz]
A 'monad' has basic perception and appetite; a 'soul' has distinct perception and memory [Leibniz]
We all expect the sun to rise tomorrow by experience, but astronomers expect it by reason [Leibniz]
We know the 'I' and its contents by abstraction from awareness of necessary truths [Leibniz]
Falsehood involves a contradiction, and truth is contradictory of falsehood [Leibniz]
No fact can be real and no proposition true unless there is a Sufficient Reason (even if we can't know it) [Leibniz]
Truths of reason are known by analysis, and are necessary; facts are contingent, and their opposites possible [Leibniz]
Mathematical analysis ends in primitive principles, which cannot be and need not be demonstrated [Leibniz]
God alone (the Necessary Being) has the privilege that He must exist if He is possible [Leibniz]
This is the most perfect possible universe, in its combination of variety with order [Leibniz]
Everything in the universe is interconnected, so potentially a mind could know everything [Leibniz]