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Single Idea 17578

[filed under theme 7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff ]

Full Idea

I have a great deal of difficulty with an ontology that includes 'stuffs' in addition to things. ...I prefer to replace talk of sameness of matter with talk of sameness of particles.

Gist of Idea

I reject talk of 'stuff', and treat it in terms of particles

Source

Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 14)

Book Ref

Inwagen,Peter van: 'Material Beings' [Cornell 1995], p.160

A Reaction

Van Inwagen is wedded to the idea that reality is composed of 'simples' - even if physicists seem now to talk of 'fields' as much as they do about objects in the fields. Has philosophy yet caught up with Maxwell?

The 17 ideas with the same theme [general masses which are fairly homogeneous]:

16771 A composite is a true unity if all of its parts fall under one essence [Scheibler]
6472 Continuity is a sufficient criterion for the identity of a rock, but not for part of a smooth fluid [Russell]
16939 Mass terms just concern spread, but other terms involve both spread and individuation [Quine]
15319 Hard individual blocks don't fix what 'things' are; fluids are no less material things [Harré/Madden]
15501 We have no idea of a third sort of thing, that isn't an individual, a class, or their mixture [Lewis]
15504 Atomless gunk is an individual whose parts all have further proper parts [Lewis]
17578 I reject talk of 'stuff', and treat it in terms of particles [Inwagen]
12793 Early pre-Socratics had a mass-noun ontology, which was replaced by count-nouns [Benardete,JA]
13386 If objects are just conventional, there is no ontological distinction between stuff and things [Jubien]
13488 Mass words do not have plurals, or numerical adjectives, or use 'fewer' [Hart,WD]
15014 Unlike things, stuff obeys unrestricted composition and mereological essentialism [Sider]
12847 Mass nouns admit 'much' and 'a little', and resist 'many' and 'few'. [Simons]
12863 Mass terms (unlike plurals) are used with indifference to whether they can exist in units [Simons]
12862 Gold is not its atoms, because the atoms must be all gold, but gold contains neutrons [Simons]
12792 The category of stuff does not suit reference [Laycock]
12799 Descriptions of stuff are neither singular aggregates nor plural collections [Laycock]
17436 We talk of snow as what stays the same, when it is a heap or drift or expanse [Koslicki]